MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:  I have had no immediate conference with Judge Douglas, but I will venture to say that he and I will perfectly agree that your entire silence, both when I speak and when he speaks, will be most agreeable to us.

In the month of May, I856, the elements in the State of Illinois, which have since been consolidated into the Republican party, assembled together in a State Convention at Bloomington.  They adopted at that time, what, in political language, is called a platform.  In June of the same year, the elements of the Republican party in the nation assembled together in a National Convention at Philadelphia.  They adopted what is called the National Platform.  In June, I858—the present year—the Republicans of Illinois reassembled at Springfield, in State Convention, and adopted again their platform, as I suppose, not differing in any essential particular from either of the former ones, but perhaps adding something in relation to the new developments of political progress in the country.

The Convention that assembled in June last did me the honor, if it be one, and I esteem it such, to nominate me as their candidate for the United States Senate.  I have supposed that, in entering upon this canvass, I stood generally upon these platforms.  We are now met together on the 13th of October of the same year, only four months from the adoption of the last platform, and I am unaware that in this canvass, from the beginning until to-day, any one of our adversaries has taken hold of our platforms, or laid his finger upon any thing that he calls wrong in them.

In the very first one of these joint discussions between Senator Douglas and myself, Senator Douglas, without alluding at all to these platforms, or any one of them, of which I have spoken, attempted to hold me responsible for a set of resolutions passed long before the meeting of either one of these Conventions of which I have spoken.  And as a ground for holding me responsible for these resolutions, he assumed that they had been passed at a State Convention of the Republican party, and that I took part in that Convention.  It was discovered afterward that this was erroneous, that the resolutions which he endeavored to hold me responsible for, had not been passed by any State Convention any where—had not been passed at Springfield, where he supposed they had, or assumed that they had, and that they had been passed in no Convention in which I had taken part.  The Judge, nevertheless, was not willing to give up the point that he was endeavoring to make upon me, and he therefore thought to still hold me to the point that he was endeavoring to make, by showing that the resolutions that he read, had been passed at a local Convention in the northern part of the State, although it was not a local Convention that embraced my residence at all, nor one that reached, as I suppose, nearer than one hundred and fifty or two hundred miles of where I was when it met, nor one in which I took any part at all.  He also introduced other resolutions, passed at other meetings, and by combining the whole, although they were all antecedent to the two State Conventions, and the one National Convention I have mentioned, still he insisted and now insists, as I understand, that I am in some way responsible for them.

At Jonesboro, on our third meeting, I insisted to the Judge that I was in no way rightfully held responsible for the proceedings of this local meeting or Convention in which I had taken no part, and in which I was in no way embraced; but I insisted to him that if he thought I was responsible for every man or every set of men every where, who happen to be my friends, the rule ought to work both ways, and he ought to be responsible for the acts and resolutions of all men or sets of men who were or are now his supporters and friends, and gave him a pretty long string of resolutions, passed by men who are now his friends, and announcing doctrines for which he does not desire to be held responsible.

This still does not satisfy Judge Douglas.  He still adheres to his proposition, that I am responsible for what some of my friends in different parts of' the State have done; but that he is not responsible for what his have done.  At least, so I understand him.  But in addition to that, the Judge, at our meeting in Galesburgh, last week, undertakes to establish that I am guilty of a species of double-dealing with the public—that I make speeches of a certain sort in the north, among the Abolitionists, which I would not make in the south, and that I make speeches of a certain sort in the south which I would not make in the north.  I apprehend, in the course I have marked out for myself, that I shall not have to dwell at very great length upon this subject.

As this was done in the Judge's opening speech at Galesburgh, I had an opportunity, as I had the middle speech then, of saying something in answer to it.  He brought forward a quotation or two from a speech of mine, delivered at Chicago, and then to contrast with it, he brought forward an extract from a speech of mine at Charleston, in which he insisted that I was greatly inconsistent, and insisted that his conclusion followed that I was playing a double part, and speaking in one region one way, and in another region another way.  I have not time now to dwell on this as long as I would like, and wish only now to requote that portion of my speech at Charleston, which the Judge quoted, and then make some comments upon it.  This he quotes from me as being delivered at Charleston, and I believe correctly: “I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races—that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which will ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality.  And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together, there must be the position of superior and inferior.  I am as much as any other man in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race.”  This, I believe is the entire quotation from the Charleston speech, as Judge Douglas made it.  His comments are as follows:

“Yes, here you find men who hurra for Lincoln, and say he is right when he discards all distinction between races, or when he declares that he discards the doctrine that there is such a thing as a superior and inferior race; and Abolitionists are required and expected to vote for Mr. Lincoln because he goes for the equality of races, holding that in the Declaration of Independence the white man and negro were declared equal, and endowed by divine law with equality.  And down south with the old line Whigs, with the Kentuckians, the Virginians, and the Tennesseeans, he tells you that there is a physical difference between the races, making the one superior, the other inferior, and he is in favor of maintaining the superiority of the white race over the negro.”

Those are the Judge's comments.  Now I wish to show you, that a month, or, only lacking three days of a month, before I made the speech at Charleston, which the Judge quotes from, he had himself heard me say substantially the same thing.  It was in our first meeting, at Ottawa—and I will say a word about where it was, and the atmosphere it was in, after awhile—but at our first meeting, at Ottawa, I read an extract from an old speech of mine, made nearly four years ago, not merely to show my sentiments, but to show that my sentiments were long entertained and openly expressed; in which extract I expressly declared that my own feelings would not admit a social and political equality between the white and black races, and that even if my own feelings would admit of it, I still knew that the public sentiment of the country would not, and that such a thing was an utter impossibility, or substantially that.  That extract from my old speech, the reporters, by some sort of accident, passed over, and it was not reported.  I lay no blame upon any body.  I suppose they thought that I would hand it over to them, and dropped reporting while I was reading it, but afterward went away without getting it from me.  At the end of that quotation from my old speech, which I read at Ottawa, I made the comments which were reported at that time, and which I will now read, and ask you to notice how very nearly they are the same as Judge Douglas says were delivered by me, down in Egypt.  After reading I added these words: “Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any great length, but this is the true complexion of all I have ever said in regard to the institution of slavery or the black race, and this is the whole of it; any thing that argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the negro, is but a specious and fantastical arrangement of words by which a man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse.  I will say here, while upon this subject, that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution in the States where it exists.  I believe I have no right to do so.  I have no inclination to do so.  I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races.  There is a physical difference between the two, which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living together on the footing of perfect equality, and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position.  I have never said any thing to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence—the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man.  I agree with Judge Douglas that he is not my equal in many respects, certainly not in color—perhaps not in intellectual and moral endowments; but in the right to eat the bread without the leave of any body else which his own hand earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every other man.”

I have chiefly introduced this for the purpose of meeting the Judge’s charge that the quotation he took from my Charleston speech was what I would say down south among the Kentuckians, the Virginians, etc., but would not say in the regions in which was supposed to be more of the Abolition element.  I now make this comment: That speech from which I have now read the quotation, and which is there given correctly, perhaps too much so for good taste, was made away up north in the Abolition District of this State par excellence—in the Lovejoy District—in the personal presence of Lovejoy, for he was on the stand with us when I made it.  It had been made and put in print in that region only three days less than a month before the speech made at Charleston, the like of which Judge Douglas thinks I would not make where there was any Abolition element, I only refer to this matter to say that I am altogether unconscious of having attempted any double-dealing any where—that upon one occasion I may say one thing and leave other things unsaid, and vice versa; but that I have said any thing on one occasion that is inconsistent with what I have said elsewhere, I deny—at least I deny it so far as the intention is concerned.  I find that I have devoted to this topic a larger portion of my time than I had intended.  I wished to show, but I will pass it upon this occasion, that in the sentiment I have occasionally advanced upon the Declaration of Independence, I am entirely borne out by the sentiments advanced by our old Whig leader, Henry Clay, and I have the book here to show it from; but because I have already occupied more time than I intended to do on that topic, I pass over it.

At Galesburgh, I tried to show that by the Dred Scott decision, pushed to its legitimate consequences, slavery would be established in all the States as well as in the Territories.  I did this because, upon a former occasion, I had asked Judge Douglas whether, if the Supreme Court should make a decision declaring that the States had not the power to exclude slavery from their limits, he would adopt and follow that decision as a rule of political action; and because he had not directly answered that question, but had merely contented himself with sneering at it, I again introduced it, and tried to show that the conclusion that I stated followed inevitably and logically from the proposition already decided by the court.  Judge Douglas had the privilege of replying to me at Galesburgh, and again he gave me no direct answer as to whether he would or would not sustain such a decision if made.  I give him this third chance to say yes or no.  He is not obliged to do either—probably he will not do either—but I give him the third chance.  I tried to show then that this result—this conclusion inevitably followed from the point already decided by the court.  The Judge, in his reply, again sneers at the thought of the court making any such decision, and in the course of his remarks upon this subject, uses the language which I will now read.  Speaking of me the Judge says:

“He goes on and insists that the Dred Scott decision would carry slavery into the free States, notwithstanding the decision itself says the contrary.”  And he adds: “Mr. Lincoln knows that there is no member of the Supreme Court that holds that doctrine.  He knows that every one of them in their opinions held the reverse.”

I especially introduce this subject again for the purpose of saying that I have the Dred Scott decision here, and I will thank Judge Douglas to lay his finger upon the place in the entire opinions of the court where any one of them “says the contrary.”  It is very hard to affirm a negative with entire confidence.  I say, however, that I have examined that decision with a good deal of care, as a lawyer examines a decision, and so far as I have been able to do so, the court has no where in its opinions said that the States have the power to exclude slavery, nor have they used other language substantially that.  I also say, so far as I can find, not one of the concurring Judges has said that the States can exclude slavery, nor said any thing that was substantially that.  The nearest approach that any one of them has made to it, so far as I can find, was by Judge Nelson, and the approach he made to it was exactly, in substance, the Nebraska Bill—that the States had the exclusive power over the question of slavery, so far as they are not limited by the Constitution of the United States.  I asked the question therefore, if the non-concurring Judges, McLean or Curtis, had asked to get an express declaration that the States could absolutely exclude slavery from their limits, what reason have we to believe that it would not have been voted down by the majority of the Judges, just as Chase’s amendment was voted down by Judge Douglas and his compeers when it was offered to the Nebraska Bill.

Also at Galesburgh, I said something in regard to those Springfield resolutions that Judge Douglas had attempted to use upon me at Ottawa, and commented at some length upon the fact that they were, as presented, not genuine.  Judge Douglas in his reply to me seemed to be somewhat exasperated.  He said he would never have believed that Abraham Lincoln, as he kindly called me, would have attempted such a thing as I had attempted upon that occasion; and among other expressions which he used toward me, was that I dared to say forgery—that I had dared to say forgery [turning to Judge Douglas].  Yes, Judge, I did dare to say forgery.  But in this political canvass, the Judge ought to remember that I was not the first who dared to say forgery.  At Jacksonville Judge Douglas made a speech in answer to something said by Judge Trumbull, and at the close of what he said upon that subject, he dared to say that Trumbull had forged his evidence.  He said, too, that he should not concern himself with Trumbull any more, but thereafter he should hold Lincoln responsible for the slanders upon him.  When I met him at Charleston after that, although I think that I should not have noticed the subject if he had not said he would hold me responsible for it, I spread out before him the statements of the evidence that Judge Trumbull had used, and I asked Judge Douglas, piece by piece, to put his finger upon one piece of all that evidence that he would say was a forgery!  When I went through with each and every piece, Judge Douglas did not dare then to say that any piece of it was a forgery.  So it seems that there are some things that Judge Douglas dares to do, and some that he dares not to do.

A voice—“It's the same thing with you.”

Mr.  Lincoln—Yes, sir, it's the same thing with me.  I do dare to say forgery when it’s true, and don't dare to say forgery when it’s false.  Now, I will say here to this audience and to Judge Douglas, I have not dared to say he committed a forgery,and I never shall until I know it; but I did dare to say—just to suggest to the Judge—that a forgery had been committed, which by his own showing had been traced to him and two of his friends.  I dared to suggest to him that he had expressly promised in one of his public speeches to investigate that matter, and I dared to suggest to him that there was an implied promise that when he investigated it he would make known the result.  I dared to suggest to the Judge that he could not expect to be quite clear of suspicion of that fraud, for since the time, that promise was made he had been with those friends, and had not kept his promise in regard to the investigation and the report upon it.  I am not a very daring man, but I dared that much, Judge, and I am not much scared about it yet.  When the Judge says he wouldn’t have believed of Abraham Lincoln that he would have made such an attempt as that, he reminds me of the fact that he entered upon this canvass with the purpose to treat me courteously; that touched me somewhat.  It sets me to thinking.  I was aware, when it was first agreed that Judge Douglas and I were to have these seven joint discussions, that they were the successive acts of a drama—perhaps I should say, to be enacted not merely in the face of audiences like this, but in the face of the nation, and to some extent, by my relation to him, and not from any thing in myself, in the face of the world; and I am anxious that they should be conducted with dignity and in the good temper which would be befitting the vast audience before which it was conducted.  But when Judge Douglas got home from Washington and made his first speech in Chicago, the evening afterward I made some sort of a reply to it.  His second speech was made at Bloomington, in which he commented upon my speech at Chicago, and said that I had used language ingeniously contrived to conceal my intentions, or words to that effect.  Now, I understand that this is an imputation upon my veracity and my candor.  I do not know what the Judge understood by it but in our first discussion at Ottawa, he led off by charging a bargain, somewhat corrupt in its character, upon Trumbull and myself—that we had entered into a bargain, one of the terms of which was that Trumbull was to abolitionize the old Democratic party, and I (Lincoln) was to abolitionize the old Whig party—I pretending to be as good an old line Whig as ever.  Judge Douglas may not understand that he implicated my truthfulness and my honor, when he said I was doing one thing and pretending another; and I misunderstood him if he thought he was treating me in a dignified way, as a man of honor and truth, as he now claims he was disposed to treat me.  Even after that time, at Galesburgh, when he brings forward an extract from a speech made at Chicago, and an extract from a speech made at Charleston, to prove that I was trying to play a double part—that I was trying to cheat the public, and get votes upon one set of principles at one place and upon another set of principles at another place—I do not understand but what he impeaches my honor, my veracity and my candor, and because he does this, I do not understand that I am bound, if I see a truthful ground for it, to keep my hands off of him.  As soon as I learned that Judge Douglas was disposed to treat me in this way, I signified in one of my speeches that I should be driven to draw upon whatever of humble resources I might have—to adopt a new course with him.  I was not entirely sure that I should be able to hold my own with him, but I at least had the purpose made to do as well as I could upon him; and now I say that I will not be the first to cry “hold.”  I think it originated with the Judge, and when he quits, I probably will.  But I shall not ask any favors at all.  He asks me, or he asks the audience, if I wish to push this matter to the point of personal difficulty.  I tell him, no.  He did not make a mistake, in one of his early speeches, when he called me an “amiable” man, though perhaps he did when he called me an “intelligent” man.  It really hurts me very much to suppose that I have wronged any body on earth.  I again tell him, no!  I very much prefer, when this canvass shall be over, however it may result, that we at least part without any bitter recollections of personal difficulties.

The Judge, in his concluding speech at Galesburgh, says that I was pushing this matter to a personal difficulty, to avoid the responsibility for the enormity of my principles.  I say to the Judge and this audience now, that I will again state our principles as well as I hastily can in all their enormity, and if the Judge hereafter chooses to confine himself to a war upon these principles, he will probably not find me departing from the same course.

We have in this nation this element of domestic slavery.  It is a matter of absolute certainty that it is a disturbing element.  It is the opinion of all the great men who have expressed an opinion upon it, that it is a dangerous element.  We keep up a controversy in regard to it.  That controversy necessarily springs from difference of opinion, and if we can learn exactly—can reduce to the lowest elements—what that difference of opinion is, we perhaps shall be better prepared for discussing the different systems of policy that we would propose in regard to that disturbing element.  I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms, is no other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong.  The Republican party think it wrong—we think it is a moral, a social and a political wrong.  We think it as a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the States where it exists, but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to say the least, that extends itself to the existence of the whole nation.  Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong.  We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may he some promise of an end to it.  We have a due regard to the actual presence of it amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and all the Constitutional obligations thrown about it.  I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in the nation, and to our Constitutional obligations, we have no right at all to disturb it in the States where it exists, and we profess that we have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to do it.  We go further than that; we don't propose to disturb it where, in one instance, we think the Constitution would permit us.  We think the Constitution would permit us to disturb it in the District of Columbia.  Still we do not propose to do that, unless it should be in terms which I don't suppose the nation is very likely soon to agree to—the terms of making the emancipation gradual and compensating the unwilling owners.  Where we suppose we have the Constitutional right, we restrain ourselves in reference to the actual existence of the institution and the difficulties thrown about it.  We also oppose it as an evil so far as it seeks to spread itself.  We insist on the policy that shall restrict it to its present limits.  We don't suppose that in doing this we violate any thing due to the actual presence of the institution, or any thing due to the Constitutional guaranties thrown around it.

We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you a few words.  We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free.  We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule, which shall be binding on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members, of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision.  We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States themselves.  We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.

I will add this, that if there be any man who does not believe that slavery is wrong in the three aspects which I have mentioned, or in any one of them, that man is misplaced, and ought to leave us.  While, on the other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is impatient over the necessity springing from its actual presence, and is impatient of the Constitutional guaranties thrown around it, and would act in disregard of these, he too is misplaced, standing with us.  He will find his place somewhere else; for we have a due regard, so far as we are capable of understanding them, for all these things.  This, gentlemen, as well as I can give it, is a plain statement of our principles in all their enormity.

I will say now that there is a sentiment in the country contrary to me—a sentiment which holds that slavery is not wrong, and therefore it goes for the policy that does not propose dealing with it as a wrong.  That policy is the Democratic policy, and that sentiment is the Democratic sentiment.  If there be a doubt in the mind of any one of this vast audience that this is really the central idea of the Democratic party, in relation to this subject, I ask him to bear with me while I state a few things tending, as I think, to prove that proposition.  In the first place, the leading man—I think I may do my friend Judge Douglas the honor of calling him such—advocating the present Democratic policy, never himself says it is wrong.  He has the high distinction, so far as I know, of never having said slavery is either right or wrong.  Almost every body else says one or the other, but the Judge never does.  If there be a man in the Democratic party who thinks it is wrong, and yet clings to that party, I suggest to him in the first place that his leader don't talk as he does, for he never says that it is wrong.  In the second place, I suggest to him that if he will examine the policy proposed to be carried forward, he will find that he carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong in it.  If you will examine the arguments that are made on it, you will find that every one carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong in slavery.  Perhaps that Democrat who says he is as much opposed to slavery as I am, will tell me that I am wrong about this.  I wish him to examine his own course in regard to this matter a moment, and then see if his opinion will not be changed a little.  You say it is wrong; but don't you constantly object to any body else saying so?  Do you not constantly argue that this is not the right place to oppose it?  You say it must not be opposed in the free States, because slavery is not here; it must not be opposed in the slave States, because it is there; it must not be opposed in politics, because that will make a fuss; it must not be opposed in the pulpit, because it is not religion.  Then where is the place to oppose it?  There is no suitable place to oppose it.  There is no plan in the country to oppose this evil overspreading the continent, which you say yourself is coming.  Frank Blair and Gratz Brown tried to get up a system of gradual emancipation in Missouri, had an election in August and got beat, and you, Mr. Democrat, threw up your hat, and haliooed “hurra for Democracy.”  So I say again, that in regard to the arguments that are made, when Judge Douglas says he “don’t care whether slavery is voted up or voted down,” whether he means that as an individual expression of sentiment, or only as a sort of statement of his views on national policy, it is alike true to say that he can thus argue logically if he don't see any thing wrong in it; but he cannot say so logically if he admits that slavery is wrong.  He cannot say that he would as soon see a wrong voted up as voted down.  When Judge Douglas says that whoever or whatever community wants slaves, they have a right to have them, he is perfectly logical if there is nothing wrong in the institution; but if you admit that it is wrong, he cannot logically say that any body has a right to do wrong.  When he says that slave property and horse and hog property are, alike, to be allowed to go into the Territories, upon the principles of equality, he is reasoning truly, if there is no difference between them as property; but if the one is property, held rightfully, and the other is wrong, then there is no equality between the right and wrong; so that, turn it in any way you can, in all the arguments sustaining the Democratic policy, and in that policy itself, there is a careful, studied exclusion of the idea that there is any thing wrong in slavery.  Let us understand this.  I am not, just here, trying to prove that we are right and they are wrong.  I have been stating where we and they stand, and trying to show what is the real difference between us and I now say that whenever we can get the question distinctly stated—can get all these men who believe that slavery is in some of these respects wrong, to stand and act with us in treating it as a wrong—then, and not till then, I think we will in some way come to an end of this slavery agitation.
 

MR. DOUGLAS'S REPLY.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Permit me to say that unless silence is observed it will be impossible for me to be heard by this immense crowd, and my friends can confer no higher favor upon me than by omitting all expressions of applause or approbation.  I desire to be heard rather than to be applauded.  I wish to address myself to your reason, your judgment, your sense of justice, and not to your passions. 

I regret that Mr. Lincoln should have deemed it proper for him to again indulge in gross personalities and base insinuations in regard to the Springfield resolutions.  It has imposed upon me the necessity of using some portion of my time for the purpose of calling your attention to the facts of the case, and it will then be for you to say what you think of a man who can predicate such a charge upon the circumstances as he has in this.  I had seen the platform adopted by a Republican Congressional Convention held in Aurora, the Second Congressional District, in September, I854, published as purporting to be the platform of the Republican party.  That platform declared that the Republican party was pledged never to admit another slave State into the Union, and also that it pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, not only all that we then had, but all that we should thereafter acquire, and to repeal unconditionally the Fugitive Slave law, abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibit the slave-trade between the different States.  These and other articles against slavery were contained in this platform, and unanimously adopted by the Republican Congressional Convention in that District.  I had also seen that the Republican Congressional Conventions at Rockford, in the First District, and at Bloomington, in the Third, had adopted the same platform that year, nearly word for word, and had declared it to be the platform of the Republican party.  I had noticed that Major Thomas L. Harris, a member of Congress from the Springfield District, had referred to that platform in a speech in Congress as having been adopted by the first Republican State Convention which assembled in Illinois.  When I had occasion to use the fact in this canvass, I wrote to Major Harris to know on what day that Convention was held, and to ask him to send me its proceedings.  He being sick, Charles H. Lanphier answered my letter by sending me the published proceedings of the Convention held at Springfield on the 5th of October, 1854, as they appeared in the report of the State Register.  I read those resolutions from that newspaper the same as any of you would refer back and quote any fact from the files of a newspaper which had published it.  Mr. Lincoln pretends that after I had so quoted those resolutions he discovered that they had never been adopted at Springfield.  He does not deny their adoption by the Republican party at Aurora, at Bloomington, and at Rockford, and by nearly all the Republican County Conventions in Northern Illinois where his party is in a majority, but merely because they were not adopted on the “spot” on which I said they were, he chooses to quibble about the place rather than meet and discuss the merits of the resolutions themselves.  I stated when I quoted them that I did so from the State Register.  I gave my authority.  Lincoln believed at the time, as he has since admitted, that they had been adopted at Springfield, as published.  Does he believe now, that I did not tell the truth when I quoted those resolutions?  He knows, in his heart, that I quoted them in good faith, believing, at the time, that they had been adopted at Springfield.  I would consider myself an infamous wretch, if, under such circumstances, I could charge any man with being a party to a trick or a fraud.  And I will tell him, too, that it will not do to charge a forgery on Charles H. Lanphier or Thomas L. Harris.  No man on earth, who knows them, and knows Lincoln, would take his oath against their word.  There are not two men in the State of Illinois who have higher characters for truth, for integrity, for moral character, and for elevation of tone, as gentlemen, than Mr. Lanphier and Mr. Harris.  Any man who attempts to make such charges as Mr. Lincoln has indulged in against them, only proclaims himself a slanderer. 

I will now show you that I stated with entire fairness, as soon as it was made known to me, that there was a mistake about the spot where the resolutions had been adopted, although their truthfulness, as a declaration of the principles of the Republican party, had not and could not be questioned.  I did not wait for Lincoln to point out the mistake; but the moment I discovered it, I made a speech, and published it to the world, correcting the error.  I corrected it myself, as a gentleman, and an honest man, and as I always feel proud to do when I have made a mistake.  I wish Mr. Lincoln could show that he has acted with equal fairness, and truthfulness, when I have convinced him that he has been mistaken.  I will give you an illustration to show you how he acts in a similar case: In a speech at Springfield, he charged Chief Justice Taney, and his associates, President Pierce, President Buchanan, and myself, with having entered into a conspiracy at the time the Nebraska bill was introduced, by which the Dred Scott decision was to be made by the Supreme Court, in order to carry slavery every where under the Constitution.  I called his attention to the fact, that at the time alluded to, to wit: the introduction of the Nebraska bill, it was not possible that such a conspiracy could have been entered into, for the reason that the Dred Scott case had never been taken before the Supreme Court, and was not taken before it for a year after; and I asked him to take back that charge.  Did he do it?   I showed him that it was impossible that the charge could be true; I proved it by the record, and I then called upon him to retract his false charge.  What was his answer?  Instead of coming out like an honest man and doing so, he reiterated the charge, and said that if the case had not gone up to the Supreme Court from the courts of Missouri at the time he charged that the Judges of the Supreme Court entered into the conspiracy, yet, that there was an understanding with the Democratic owners of Dred Scott that they would take it up.  I have since asked him who the Democratic owners of Dred Scott were, but he could not tell, and why?  Because there were no such Democratic owners in existence.  Dred Scott at the time was owned by the Rev. Dr. Chaffee, an Abolition member of Congress, of Springfield, Massachusetts, in right of his wife.  He was owned by one of Lincoln’s friends, and not by Democrats at all; his case was conducted in court by Abolition lawyers, so that both the prosecution and the defense were in the hands of the Abolition political friends of Mr. Lincoln.  Notwithstanding I thus proved by the record that his charge against the Supreme Court was false, instead of taking it back, he resorted to another false charge to sustain the infamy of it.  He also charged President Buchanan with having been a party to the conspiracy.  I directed his attention to the fact that the charge could not possibly be true, for the reason that at the time specified, Mr.  Buchanan was not in America, but was three thousand miles off, representing the United States at the Court of St. James, and had been there for a year previous, and did not return until three years afterward.  Yet, I never could get Mr.  Lincoln to take back his false charge, although I have called upon him over and over again.  He refuses to do it, and either remains silent, or resorts to other tricks to try and palm his slander off on the country.  Therein you will find the difference between Mr. Lincoln and myself.  When I make a mistake, as an honest man, I correct it without being asked to do so, but when he makes a false charge he sticks to it, and never corrects it.  One word more in regard to these resolutions: I quoted them at Ottawa merely to ask Mr. Lincoln whether he stood on that platform.  That was the purpose for which I quoted them.  I did not think that I had a right to put idle questions to him, and I first laid a foundation for my questions by showing that the principles which I wished him either to affirm or deny had been adopted by some portion of his friends, at least as their creed.  Hence I read the resolutions, and put the questions to him, and he then refused to answer them.  Subsequently, one week afterward, he did answer a part of them, but the others he has not answered up to this day. 

Now, let me call your attention for a moment to the answers which Mr. Lincoln made at Freeport to the questions which I propounded him at Ottawa, based upon the platform adopted by a majority of the Abolition counties of the State, which now as then supported him.  In answer to my question whether he indorsed the Black Republican principle of “no more slave States,” he answered that he was not pledged against the admission of any more slave States, but that he would be very sorry if he should ever be placed in a position where he would have to vote on the question; that he would rejoice to know that no more slave States would be admitted into the Union; “but,” he added, “if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall having a fair chance and a clear field when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.”  The point I wish him to answer is this: Suppose Congress should not prohibit slavery in the Territory, and it applied for admission with a Constitution recognizing slavery, then how would he vote?  His answer at Freeport does not apply to any territory in America.  I ask you [turning to Lincoln], will you vote to admit Kansas into the Union, with just such a Constitution as her people want, with slavery or without, as they shall determine?  He will not answer.  I have put that question to him time and time again, and have not been able to get an answer out of him.  I ask you again, Lincoln, will you vote to admit New Mexico when she has the requisite population with such a Constitution as her people adopt, either recognizing slavery or not, as they shall determine?  He will not answer.  I put the same question to him in reference to Oregon and the new States to be carved out of Texas, in pursuance of the contract between Texas and the United States, and he will not answer.  He will not answer these questions in reference to any territory now in existence; but says, that if Congress should prohibit slavery in a Territory, and when its people asked for admission as a State, they should adopt slavery as one of their institutions, that he supposes he would have to let it come in.  I submit to you whether that answer of his to my question does not justify me in saying that he has a fertile genius in devising language to conceal his thoughts.  I ask you whether there is an intelligent man in America who does not believe, that that answer was made for the purpose of concealing what he intended to do.  He wished to make the old line Whigs believe that he would stand by the Compromise measures of I850, which declared that the States might come into the Union with slavery, or without, as they pleased, while Lovejoy and his Abolition allies up North, explained to the Abolitionists, that in taking this ground he preached good Abolition doctrine, because his proviso would not apply to any territory in America, and therefore there was no chance of his being governed by it.  It would have been quite easy for him to have said, that he would let the people of a State do just as they pleased, if he desired to convey such an idea.  Why did he not do it?   He would not answer my question directly, because up north, the Abolition creed declares that there shall be no more slave States, while down south, in Adams county, in Coles, and in Sangamon, he and his friends are afraid to advance that doctrine.  Therefore, he gives an evasive and equivocal answer, to be construed one way in the south and another way in the north, which, when analyzed, it is apparent is not an answer at all with reference to any territory now in existence. 

Mr. Lincoln complains that, in my speech the other day at Galesburgh, I read an extract from a speech delivered by him at Chicago, and then another from his speech at Charleston, and compared them, thus showing the people that he had one set of principles in one part of the State and another in the other part.  And how does he answer that charge?  Why, he quotes from his Charleston speech as I quoted from it, and then quotes another extract from a speech which he made at another place, which he says is the same as the extract from his speech at Charleston; but he does not quote the extract from his Chicago speech, upon which I convicted him of double-dealing.  I quoted from his Chicago speech to prove that he held one set of principles up north among the Abolitionists, and from his Charleston speech to prove that he held another set down at Charleston and in southern Illinois.  In his answer to this charge, he ignores entirely his Chicago speech, and merely argues that he said the same thing which he said at Charleston at another place.  If he did, it follows that he has twice, instead of once, held one creed in one part of the State and a different creed in another part.  Up at Chicago, in the opening of the campaign, he reviewed my reception speech, and undertook to answer my argument attacking his favorite doctrine of negro equality.  I had shown that it was a falsification of the Declaration of Independence to pretend that that instrument applied to and included negroes in the clause declaring that all men were created equal.  What was Lincoln's reply?  I will read from his Chicago speech and the one which he did not quote, and dare not quote, in this part of the State.  He said:

“I should like to know, if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making exceptions to it, where will it stop?  If one man says it does not mean a negro, why may not another man say it does not mean another man?  If that declaration is not the truth, let us get this statute book in which we find it and tear it out.”

There you find that Mr. Lincoln told the Abolitionists of Chicago that if the Declaration of Independence did not declare that the negro was created by the Almighty the equal of the white man, that you ought to take that instrument and tear out the clause which says that all men were created equal.  But let me call your attention to another part of the same speech.  You know that in his Charleston speech, an extract from which he has read, he declared that the negro belongs to an inferior race; is physically inferior to the white man, and should always be kept in an inferior position.  I will now read to you what he said at Chicago on that point.  In concluding his speech at that place, he remarked:

“My friends, I have detained you about as long as I desire to do, and I have only to say let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man—this race and that race, and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position, discarding our standard that we have left us.  Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this land until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal.”

Thus you see, that when addressing the Chicago Abolitionists he declared that all distinctions of race must be discarded and blotted out, because the negro stood on an equal footing with the white man; that if one man said the Declaration of Independence did not mean a negro when it declared all men created equal, that another man would say that it did not mean another man; and hence we ought to discard all difference between the negro race and all other races, and declare them all created equal.  Did old Giddings, when he came down among you four years ago, preach more radical Abolitionism than this?   Did Lovejoy, or Lloyd Garrison, or Wendell Phillips, or Fred Douglass, ever take higher Abolition grounds than that?  Lincoln told you that I had charged him with getting up these personal attacks to conceal the enormity of his principles, and then commenced talking about something else, omitting to quote this part of his Chicago speech which contained the enormity of his principles to which I alluded.  He knew that I alluded to his negro-equality doctrines when I spoke of the enormity of his principles, yet he did not find it convenient to answer on that point.  Having shown you what he said in his Chicago speech in reference to negroes being created equal to white men, and about discarding all distinctions between the two races, I will again read to you what he said at Charleston:

“I will say then, that I am not nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way, the social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters of the the free negroes, or jurors, or qualifying them to hold office, or having them to marry with white people.  I will say in addition, that there is a physical difference between the white and black races, which, I suppose, will forever forbid the two races living together upon terms of social and political equality, and inasmuch as they cannot so live, that while they do remain together, there must be the position of superior and inferior, that I as much as any other man am in favor of the superior position being assigned to the white man.”

A voice—“That's the doctrine.”

Mr. Douglas—Yes, sir, that is good doctrine, but Mr.  Lincoln is afraid to advocate it in the latitude of Chicago, where he hopes to get his votes.  It is good doctrine in the anti-Abolition counties for him, and his Chicago speech is good doctrine in the Abolition counties.  I assert, on the authority of these two speeches of Mr. Lincoln, that he holds one set of principles in the Abolition counties, and a different and contradictory set in the other counties.  I do not question that he said at Ottawa what he quoted, but that only convicts him further, by proving that he has twice contradicted himself instead of once.  Let me ask him why he cannot avow his principles the same in the North as in the South—the same in every county, if he has a conviction that they are just?  But I forgot—he would not be a Republican, if his principles would apply alike to every part of the country.  The party to which he belongs is bounded and limited by geographical lines.  With their principles they cannot even cross the Mississippi river on your ferry-boats.  They cannot crossover the Ohio into Kentucky.  Lincoln himself cannot visit the land of his fathers, the scenes of his childhood, the graves of his ancestors, and carry his Abolition principles, as he declared them at Chicago, with him. 

This Republican organization appeals to the North against the South; it appeals to northern passion, northern prejudice, and northern ambition, against southern people, southern States, and southern institutions, and its only hope of success is by that appeal.  Mr. Lincoln goes on to justify himself in making a war upon slavery, upon the ground that Frank Blair and Gratz Brown did not succeed in their warfare upon the institutions in Missouri.  Frank Blair was elected to Congress in I856, from the State of Missouri, as a Buchanan Democrat, and he turned Freemonter after the people elected him, thus belonging to one party before his election, and another afterward.  What right then had he to expect, after having thus cheated his constituency, that they would support him at another election?  Mr. Lincoln thinks that it is his duty to preach a crusade in the free States against slavery, because it is a crime, as he believes, and ought to be extinguished; and because the people of the slave States will never abolish it.  How is he going to abolish it?  Down in the southern part of the State he takes the ground openly that he will not interfere with slavery where it exists, and says that he is not now and never was in favor of interfering with slavery where it exists in the States.  Well, if he is not in favor of that, how does he expect to bring slavery in a course of ultimate extinction?  How can he extinguish it in Kentucky, in Virginia, in all the slave States by his policy, if he will not pursue a policy which will interfere with it in the States where it exists?  In his speech at Springfield before the Abolition or Republican Convention, he declared his hostility to any more slave States in this language:

“Under the operation of that policy the agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented.  In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed.  ‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’  I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.  I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided.  It will become all one thing or all the other.  Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or, its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States—old as well as new, north as well as south.”

Mr. Lincoln there told his Abolition friends that this Government could not endure permanently, divided into free and slave States as our fathers made it, and that it must become all free or all slave, otherwise, that the Government could not exist.  How then does Lincoln propose to save the Union, unless by compelling all the States to become free, so that the house shall not be divided against itself?  He intends making them all free; he will preserve the Union in that way, and yet, he is not going to interfere with slavery any where it now exists.  How is he going to bring it about?  Why, he will agitate, he will induce the North to agitate until the South shall be worried out, and forced to abolish slavery.  Let us examine the policy by which that is to be done.  He first tells you that he would prohibit slavery everywhere in the Territories.  He would thus confine slavery within its present limits.  When he thus gets it confined, and surrounded, so that it cannot spread, the natural laws of increase will go on until the negroes will be so plenty that they cannot live on the soil.  He will hem them in until starvation seizes them, and by starving them to death, he will put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction.  If he is not going to interfere with slavery in the States, but intends to interfere and prohibit it in the Territories, and thus smother slavery out, it naturally follows, that he can extinguish it only by extinguishing the negro race, for his policy would drive them to starvation.  This is the humane and Christian remedy that he proposes for the great crime of slavery. 

He tells you that I will not argue the question whether slavery is right or wrong.  I tell you why I will not do it.  I hold that under the Constitution of the United States, each State of this Union has a right to do as it pleases on the subject of slavery.  In Illinois we have exercised that sovereign right by prohibiting slavery within our own limits.  I approve of that line of policy.  We have performed our whole duty in Illinois.  We have gone as far as we have a right to go under the Constitution of our common country.  It is none of our business whether slavery exists in Missouri or not.  Missouri is a sovereign State of this Union, and has the same right to decide the slavery question for herself that Illinois has to decide it for herself.  Hence I do not choose to occupy the time allotted to me in discussing a question that we have no right to act upon.  I thought that you desired to hear us upon those questions coming within our Constitutional power or action.  Lincoln will not discuss these.  What one question has he discussed that comes within the power or calls for the action or interference of an United States Senator?  He is going to discuss the rightfulness of slavery when Congress cannot act upon it either way.  He wishes to discuss the merits of the Dred Scott decision when, under the Constitution, a Senator has no right to interfere with the decision of judicial tribunals.  He wants your exclusive attention to two questions that he has no power to act upon; to two questions that he could not vote upon if he was in Congress, to two questions that are not practical, in order to conceal your attention from other questions which he might be required to vote upon should he ever become a member of Congress.  He tells you that he does not like the Dred Scott decision.  Suppose he does not, how is he going to help himself?  He says that he will reverse it.  How will he reverse it?  I know of' but one mode of reversing judicial decisions, and that is by appealing from the inferior to the superior court.  But I have never yet learned how or where an appeal could be taken from the Supreme Court of the United States!  The Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the highest tribunal on earth.  From that decision there is no appeal this side of Heaven.  Yet, Mr. Lincoln says he is going to reverse that decision.  By what tribunal will he reverse it?  Will he appeal to a mob?  Does he intend to appeal to violence, to Lynch law?  Will he stir up strife and rebellion in the land and overthrow the court by violence?  He does not deign to tell you how he will reverse the Dred Scott decision, but keeps appealing each day from the Supreme Court of the United States to political meetings in the country.  He wants me to argue with you the merits of each point of that decision before this political meeting.  I say to you, with all due respect, that I choose to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court as they are pronounced.  It is not for me to inquire after a decision is made whether I like it in all the points or not.  When I used to practice law with Lincoln, I never knew him to be beat in a case that he did not get mad at the judge and talk about appealing; and when I got beat I generally thought the court was wrong, but I never dreamed of going out of the court-house and making a stump speech to the people against the judge, merely because I had found out that I did not know the law as well as he did.  If the decision did not suit me, I appealed until I got to the Supreme Court, and then if that court, the highest tribunal in the world, decided against me, I was satisfied, because it is the duty of every law-abiding man to obey the constitutions, the laws, and the constituted authorities.  He who attempts to stir up odium and rebellion in the country against the constituted authorities, is stimulating the passions of men to resort to violence and to mobs instead of to the law.  Hence, I tell you that I take the decisions of the Supreme Court as the law of the land, and I intend to obey them as such. 

But Mr. Lincoln says that I will not answer his question as to what I would do in the event of the court making so ridiculous a decision as he imagines they would by deciding that the free State of Illinois could not prohibit slavery within her own limits.  I told him at Freeport why I would not answer such a question.  I told him that there was not a man possessing any brains in America, lawyer or not, whoever dreamed that such a thing could be done.  I told him then, as I do now, that by all the principles set forth in the Dred Scott decision, it is impossible.  I told him then, as I do now, that it is an insult to men's understanding, and a gross calumny on the court, to presume in advance that it was going to degrade itself so low as to make a decision known to be in direct violation of the Constitution. 

A voice—“The same thing was said about the Dred Scott decision before it passed.”

Mr. Douglas—Perhaps you think that the court did the same thing in reference to the Dred Scott decision: I have heard a man talk that way before.  The principles contained in the Dred Scott decision had been affirmed previously in various other decisions.  What court or judge ever held that a negro was a citizen?  The State courts had decided that question over and over again, and the Dred Scott decision on that point only affirmed what every court in the land knew to be the law. 

But, I will not be drawn off into an argument upon the merits of the Dred Scott decision.  It is enough for me to know that the Constitution of the United States created the Supreme Court for the purpose of deciding all disputed questions touching the true construction of that instrument, and when such decisions are pronounced,they are the law of the land, binding on every good citizen.  Mr. Lincoln has every convenient mode of arguing upon the subject.  He holds that because he is a Republican that he is not bound by the decisions of the court, but that I being a Democrat am so bound.  It may be that Republicans do not hold themselves bound by the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country as expounded by the courts; it may be an article in the Republican creed that men who do not like a decision, have a right to rebel against it; but when Mr. Lincoln preaches that doctrine, I think he will find some honest Republican—some law-abiding man in that party—who will repudiate such a monstrous doctrine.  The decision in the Dred Scott case is binding on every American citizen alike; and yet Mr. Lincoln argues that the Republicans are not bound by it, because they are opposed to it, whilst Democrats are bound by it, because we will not resist it.  A Democrat cannot resist the constituted authorities of this country.  A Democrat is a law-abiding man, a Democrat stands by the Constitution and the laws, and relies upon liberty as protected by law, and not upon mob or political violence. 

I have never yet been able to make Mr. Lincoln understand, nor can I make any man who is determined to support him, right or wrong, understand how it is that under the Dred Scott decision the people of a Territory, as well as a State, can have slavery or not, just as they please.  I believe that I can explain that proposition to all Constitution-loving, law-abiding men in a way that they cannot fail to understand it.  Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, said that slaves being property, the owner of them has a right to take them into a Territory the same as he would any other property; in other words, that slave property, so far as the right to enter a Territory is concerned, stands on the same footing with other property.  Suppose we grant that proposition.  Then any man has a right to go to Kansas and take his property with him, but when he gets there he must rely upon the local law to protect his property, whatever it may be.  In order to illustrate this, imagine that three of you conclude to go to Kansas.  One takes $10,000 worth of slaves, another $10,000 worth of liquors, and the third $10,000 worth of dry goods.  When the man who owns the dry goods arrives out there and commences sellingthem, he finds that he is stopped and prohibited from selling until he gets a license, which will destroy all the profits he can make on his goods to pay for.  When the man with the liquors gets there and tries to sell he finds a Maine liquor law in force which prevents him.  Now, of what use is his right to go there with his property unless he is protected in the enjoyment of that right after he gets there?  The man who goes there with his slaves finds that there is no law to protect him when he arrives there.  He has no remedy if his slaves run away to another country : there is no slave code or police regulations, and the absence of them excludes his slaves from the Territory just as effectually and as positively as a Constitutional prohibition could. 

Such was the understanding when the Kansas and Nebraska bill -was pending in Congress.  Read the speech of Speaker Orr, of South Carolina, in the House of Representatives, in 1856, on the Kansas question, and you will find that he takes the ground that while the owner of a slave has a right to go into a Territory, and carry his slaves with him, that he cannot hold them one day or hour unless there is a slave code to protect him.  He tells you that slavery would not exist a day in South Carolina, or any other State, unless there was a friendly people and friendly legislation.  Read the speeches of that giant in intellect, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, and you will find them to the same effect.  Read the speeches of Sam Smith, of Tenneseee, and of all Southern men, and you will find that they all understood this doctrine then as we understand it now.  Mr. Lincoln cannot be made to understand it, however.  Down at Jonesboro, he went on to argue that if it be the law that a man has a right to take his slaves into territory of the United States under the Constitution, that then a member of Congress was perjured if he did not vote for a slave code.  I ask him whether the decision of the Supreme Court is not binding upon him as well as on me?  If so, and he holds that he would be perjured if he did not vote for a slave code under it, I ask him whether, if elected to Congress, he will so vote?  I have a right to his answer, and I will tell you why.  He put that question to me down in Egypt, and did it with an air of triumph.  This was about the form of it: “In the event of a slaveholding citizen of one of the Territories should need and demand a slave code to protect his slaves, will you vote for it?”  I answered him that a fundamental article in the Democratic creed, as put forth in the Nebraska bill and the Cincinnati platform, was non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, and hence, that I would not vote in Congress for any code of laws, either for or against slavery in any Territory.  I will leave the people perfectly free to decide that question for themselves. 

Mr. Lincoln and the Washington Union both think this a monstrous bad doctrine.  Neither Mr. Lincoln nor the Washington Union like my Freeport speech on that subject.  The Union, in a late number, has been reading me out of the Democratic party because I hold that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, have the right to have slavery or not, as they please.  It has devoted three and a half columns to prove certain propositions, one of which I will read.  It says:

“We propose to show that Judge Douglas’s action in 1850 and 1854 was taken with especial reference to the announcement of doctrine and programme which was made at Freeport.  The declaration at Freeport was, that ‘in his opinion the people can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from a Territory before it comes in as a State;’ and he declared that his competitor had ‘heard him argue the Nebraska bill on that principle all over Illinois in 1854, 1855 and 1856, and had no excuse to pretend to have any doubt upon that subject.’”

The Washington Union there charges me with the monstrous crime of now proclaiming on the stump, the same doctrine that I carried out in 1850, by supporting Clay’s Compromise measures.  The Union also charges that I am now proclaiming the same doctrine that I did in 1854 in support of the Kansas and Nebraska bill.  It is shocked that I should now stand where I stood in 1850, when I was supported by Clay, Webster, Cass, and the great men of that day, and where I stood in 1854, and in 1856, when Mr. Buchanan was elected President.  It goes on to prove and succeeds in proving, from my speeches in Congress on Clay’s Compromise measures, that I held the same doctrines at that time that I do now, and then proves that by the Kansas and Nebraska bill I advanced the same doctrine that I now advance.  It remarks:

“So much for the course taken by Judge Douglas on the Compromises of 1850.  The record shows, beyond the possibility of cavil or dispute, that he expressly intended in those bills to give the Territorial Legislatures power to exclude slavery.  How stands his record in the memorable session of 1854, with reference to the Kansas-Nebraska bill itself?  We shall not overhaul the votes that were given on that notable measure.  Our space will not afford it.  We have his own words, however, delivered in his speech closing the great debate on that bill on the night of March 3, 1854, to show that he meant to do in 1854 precisely what he had meant to do in 1858.  The Kansas-Nebraska bill being upon its passage, he said:”

It then quotes my remarks upon the passage of the bill as follows:

“The principle which we propose to carry into effect by this bill is this: That Congress shall neither legislate slavery into any Territory or State nor out of the same; but the people shall be left free to regulate their domestic concerns in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.  In order to carry this principle into practical operation, it becomes necessary to remove whatever legal obstacles might be found in the way of its free exercise.  It is only for the purpose of carrying out this great fundamental principle of self-government that the bill renders the eighth section of the Missouri act inoperative and void. 

“Now, let me ask, will those Senators who have arraigned me, or any one of them, have the assurance to rise in his place and declare that this great principle was never thought of or advocated as applicable to territorial bills, in 1850; that, from that session until the present, nobody ever thought of incorporating this principle in all new territorial organizations, etc., etc.  I will begin with the Compromises of 1850.  Any Senator who will take the trouble to examine our journals will find that on the 25^th of March of that year I reported from the Committee on Territories two bills, including the following measures: the admission of California, a territorial government for Utah, a territorial government for New Mexico, and the adjustment of the Texas boundary.  These bills proposed to leave the people of Utah and New Mexico free to decide the slavery question for themselves, in the precise language of the Nebraska bill now under discussion.  A few weeks afterward the committee of thirteen took those bills and put a wafer between them and reported them back to the Senate as one bill, with some slight amendments.  One of these amendments was, that the Territorial Legislatures should not legislate upon the subject of African slavery.  I objected to this provision, upon the ground that it subverted the great principle of self-government, upon which the bill had been originally framed by the Territorial Committee.  On the first trial the Senate refused to strike it out, but subsequently did so, upon full debate, in order to establish that principle as the rule of action in territorial organizations.”

The Union comments thus upon my speech on that occasion. 

“Thus it is seen that, in framing the Nebraska-Kansas bill, Judge Douglas framed it in the terms and upon the model of those of Utah and New Mexico, and that in the debate he took pains expressly to revive the recollection of the voting which had taken place upon amendments affecting the powers of the Territorial Legislatures over the subject of slavery in the bills of 1850, in order to give the same meaning, force, and effect to the Nebraska-Kansas bill on this subject as had been given to those of Utah and New Mexico.”

The Union proves the following propositions: First, that I sustained Clay’s Compromise measures on the ground that they established the principle of self-government in the Territories.  Secondly, that I brought in the Kansas and Nebraska bill founded upon the same principles as Clay’s Compromise measures of 1850; and thirdly, that my Freeport speech is in exact accordance with those principles.  And what do you think is the imputation that the Union casts upon me for all this?  It says that my Freeport speech is not Democratic, and that I was not a Democrat in 1854 or in 1850!  Now is not that funny?  Think that the author of the Kansas and Nebraska bill was not a Democrat when he introduced it.  The Union says I was not a sound Democrat in 1850, nor in 1854, nor in 1856, nor am I in 1858, because I have always taken and now occupy the ground that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist in a Territory.  I wish to cite for the benefit of the Washington Union and the followers of that sheet, one authority on that point, and I hope the authority wiill be deemed satisfactory to that class of politicians.  I will read from Mr. Buchanan’s letter accepting the nomination of the Democratic Convention, for the Presidency.  You know that Mr. Buchanan, after he was nominated, declared to the Keystone Club, in a public speech, that he was no longer James Buchanan, but the embodiment of the Democratic platform.  In his letter to the committee which informed him of his nomination accepting it, he defined the meaning of the Kansas and Nebraska bill and the Cincinnati platform in these words:

“The recent legislation of Congress respecting domestic slavery, derived as it has been from the original and pure fountain of legitimate political power, the will of the majority, promises ere long to allay the dangerous excitement.  This legislation is founded upon principles as ancient as free government itself, and in accordance with them has simply declared that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits.” 

Thus you see that James Buchanan accepted the nomination at Cincinnati, on the conditions that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, should be left to decide for themselves whether slavery should or should not exist within their limits.  I sustained James Buchanan for the Presidency on that platform as adopted at Cincinnati, and expounded by himself.  He was elected President on that platform, and now we are told by the Washington Union that no man is a true Democrat who stands on the platform on which Mr. Buchanan was nominated, and which he has explained and expounded himself.  We are told that a man is not a Democrat who stands by Clay, Webster, and Cass, and the Compromise measures of 1850, and the Kansas and Nebraska bill of 1854.  Whether a man be a Democrat or not on that platform, I intend to stand there as long as I have life.  I intend to cling firmly to that great principle which declares that the right of each State and each Territory to settle the question of slavery, and every other domestic question, for themselves.  I hold that if they want a slave State, they have a right under the Constitution of the United States to make it so, and if they want a free State, it is their right to have it.  But the Union, in advocating the claims of Lincoln over me to the Senate, lays down two unpardonable heresies which it says I advocate.  The first, is the right of the people of a Territory, the same as a State, to decide for themselves the question whether slavery shall exist within their limits, in the language of Mr. Buchanan; and the second is, that a Constitution shall be submitted to the people of a Territory for its adoption or rejection before their admission as a State under it.  It so happens that Mr. Buchanan is pledged to both these heresies, for supporting which the Washington Union has read me out of the Democratic church.  In his annual message he said he trusted that the example of the Minnesota case would be followed in all future cases, requiring a submission of the Constitution; and in his letter of acceptance, he said that the people of a Territory, the same as a State, had the right to decide for themselves whether slavery should exist within their limits.  Thus you find that this little corrupt gang who control the Union, and wish to elect Lincoln in preference to me—because, as they say, of these two heresies which I support—denounce President Buchanan when they denounce me, if he stands now by the principles upon which he was elected.  Will they pretend that he does not now stand by the principles on which he was elected?  Do they hold that he has abandoned the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the Cincinnati platform, and his own letter accepting his nomination, all of which declare the right of the people of a Territory, the same as a State, to decide the slavery question for themselves?  I will not believe that he has betrayed or intends to betray the platform which elected him; but if he does, I will not follow him.  I will stand by that great principle, no matter who may desert it.  I intend to stand by it for the purpose of preserving peace between the North and the South, the free and the slave States.  If each State will only agree to mind its own business, and let its neighbors alone, there will be peace forever between us.  We in Illinois tried slavery when a Territory, and found it was not good for us in this climate, and with our surroundings, and hence we abolished it.  We then adopted a free State Constitution, as we had a right to do.  In this State we have declared that a negro shall not be a citizen, and we have also declared that he shall not be a slave.  We had a right to adopt that policy.  Missouri has just as good a right to adopt the other policy.  I am now speaking of rights under the Constitution, and not of moral or religious rights.  I do not discuss the morals of the people of Missouri, but let them settle that matter for themselves.  I hold that the people of the slaveholding States are civilized men as well as ourselves; that they bear consciences as well as we, and that they are accountable to God and their posterity, and not to us.  It is for them to decide, therefore, the moral and religious right of the slavery question for themselves within their own limits.  I assert that they had as much right under the Constitution to adopt the system of policy which they have as we had to adopt ours.  So it is with every other State in this Union.  Let each State stand firmly by that great Constitutional right, let each State mind its own business and let its neighbors alone, and there will be no trouble on this question.  If we will stand by that principle, then Mr. Lincoln will find that this Republic can exist forever divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it and the people of each State have decided.  Stand by that great principle, and we can go on as we have done, increasing in wealth, in population, in power, and in all the elements of greatness, until we shall be the admiration and terror of the world.  We can go on and enlarge as our population increase, require more room, until we make this continent one ocean-bound republic.  Under that principle the United States can perform that great mission, that destiny, which Providence has marked out for us.  Under that principle we can receive with entire safety that stream of intelligence which is constantly flowing from the Old World to the New, filling up our prairies, clearing our wildernesses and building cities, towns, railroads and other internal improvements, and thus make this the asylum of the oppressed of the whole earth.  We have this great mission to perform, and it can only be performed by adhering faithfully to that principle of self government on which our institutions were all established.  I repeat that the principle is the right of each State, each Territory, to decide this slavery question for itself, to have slavery or not, as it chooses, and it does not become Mr. Lincoln, or anybody else, to tell the people of Kentucky that they have no consciences, that they are living in a state of iniquity, and that they are cherishing an institution to their bosoms in violation of the law of God.  Better for him to adopt the doctrine of “judge not lest ye shall be judged.”  Let him perform his own duty at home, and he will have a better fate in the future.  I think there are objects of charity enough in the free States to excite the sympathies and open the pockets of all the benevolence we have amongst us, without going abroad in search of negroes, of whose condition we know nothing.  We have enough objects of charity at home, and it is our duty to take care of our own poor, and our own suffering, before we go abroad to intermeddle with other people’s business. 

My friends, I am told that my time is within two minutes of expiring.  I have omitted many topics that I would liked to have discussed before you at length.  There were many points touched by Mr. Lincoln that I have not been able to takeup for the want of time.  I have hurried over each subject that I have discussed as rapidly as possible, so as to omit but few, but one hour and a half is not time sufficient for a man to discuss at length one half of the great questions which are now dividing the public mind. 

In conclusion, I desire to return to you my grateful acknowledgments for the kindness and the courtesy with which you have listened to me.  It is something remarkable that in an audience as vast as this, composed of men of opposite politics and views, with their passions highly excited, there should be so much courtesy, kindness and respect exhibited not only toward one another, but toward the speakers, and I feel that it is due to you that I should thus express my gratitude for the kindness with which you have treated me. 

MR. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

MY FRIENDS: Since Judge Douglas has said to you in his conclusion that he had not time in an hour and a half to answer all I had said in an hour, it follows of course that I will not be able to answer in half an hour all that he said in an hour and a half. 

I wish to return to Judge Douglas my profound thanks for his public annunciation here to-day, to be put on record, that his system of policy in regard to the institution of slavery contemplates that it shall last forever.  We are getting a little nearer the true issue of this controversy, and I am profoundly grateful for this one sentence.  Judge Douglas asks you, “Why cannot the institution of slavery, or rather, why cannot the nation, part slave and part free, continue as our fathers made it forever?”  In the first place, I insist that our fathers did not make this nation half slave and half free, or part slave and part free.  I insist that they found the institution of slavery existing here.  They did not make it so, but they left it so because they knew of no way to get rid of it at that time.  When Judge Douglas undertakes to say that, as a matter of choice, the fathers of the Government made this nation part slave and part free, he assumes what is historically a falsehood.  More than that: when the fathers of the Government cut off the source of slavery by the abolition of the slave-trade, and adopted a system of restricting it from the new Territories where it had not existed, I maintain that they placed it where they understood, and all sensible men understood, it was in the course of ultimate extinction; and when Judge Douglas asks me why it cannot continue as our fathers made it, I ask him why he and his friends could not let it remain as our fathers made it? 

It is precisely all I ask of him in relation to the institution of slavery, that it shall be placed upon the basis that our fathers placed it upon.  Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, once said, and truly said, that when this Government was established, no one expected the institution of slavery to last until this day; and that the men who formed this Government were wiser and better than the men of these days; but the men of these days had experience which the fathers had not, and that experience had taught them the invention of the cotton-gin, and this had made the perpetuation of the institution of slavery a necessity in this country.  Judge Douglas could not let it stand upon the basis which our fathers placed it, but removed it, and put it upon the cotton-gin basis.  It is a question, therefore, for him and his friends to answer—why they could not let it remain where the fathers of the Government originally placed it. 

I hope nobody has understood me as trying to sustain the doctrine that we have a right to quarrel with Kentucky, or Virginia, or any of the slave States, about the institution of slavery—thus giving the Judge an opportunity to make himself eloquent and valiant against us in fighting for their rights.  I expressly declared in my opening speech, that I had neither the inclination to exercise, nor the belief in the existence of the right to interfere with the States of Kentucky or Virginia in doing as they pleased with slavery or any other existing institution.  Then what becomes of all his eloquence in behalf of the rights of States, which are assailed by no living man? 

But I have to hurry on, for I have but a half hour.  The Judge has informed me, or informed this audience, that the Washington Union is laboring for my election to the United States Senate.  This is news to me—not very ungrateful news either.  [Turning to Mr. W. H. Carlin, who was on the stand]—I hope that Carlin will be elected to the State Senate and will vote for me.  [Mr. Carlin shook his head.]  Carlin don't fall in, I perceive, and I suppose he will not do much for me, but I am glad of all the support I can get any where, if I can get it without practicing any deception to obtain it.  In respect to this large portion of Judge Douglas’s speech, in which he tries to show that in the controversy between himself and the Administration party, he is in the right, I do not feel myself at all competent or inclined to answer him.  I say to him, “Give it to them—give it to them just all you can”—and, on the other hand, I say to Carlin, and Jake Davis, and to this man Wogley up here in Hancock, “Give it to Douglas—just pour it into him.”

Now, in regard to this matter of the Dred Scott decision, I wish to say a word or two.  After all, the Judge will not say whether, if a decision is made, holding that the people of the States cannot exclude slavery, he will support it or not.  He obstinately refuses to say what he will do in that case.  The Judges of the Supreme Court as obstinately refused to say what they would do on this subject.  Before this I reminded him that at Galesburgh he said the Judges had expressly declared the contrary, and you remember that in my opening speech I told him I had the book containing that decision here, and I would thank him to lay his finger on the place where any such thing was said.  He has occupied his hour and a half, and he has not ventured to try to sustain his assertion.  He never will.  But he is desirous of knowing how we are going to reverse the Dred Scott decision.  Judge Douglas ought to know how.  Did not he and his political friends find a way to reverse the decision of that same court in favor of the Constitutionality of the National Bank?  Didn’t they find a way to do it so effectually that they have reversed it as completely as any decision ever was reversed, so far as its practical operation is concerned?  And let me ask you, didn’t Judge Douglas find a way to reverse the decision of our Supreme Court, when it decided that Carlin’s father—old Governor Carlin—had not the Constitutional power to remove a Secretary of State?  Did he not appeal to the “MOBS,” as he calls them?  Did he not make speeches in the lobby to show how villainous that decision was, and how it ought to be overthrown?  Did he not succeed, too, in getting an act passed by the Legislature to have it overthrown?  And didn’t he himself sit down on that bench as one of the five added judges, who were to overslaugh the four old ones—getting his name of “Judge” in that way and no other?  If there is a villainy in using disrespect or making opposition to Supreme Court decisions, I commend it to Judge Douglas’s earnest consideration.  I know of no man in the State of Illinois who ought to know so well about how much villainy it takes to oppose a decision of the Supreme Court as our honorable friend, Stephen Douglas.

Judge Douglas also makes the declaration that I say the Democrats are bound by the Dred Scott decision, while the Republicans are not.  In the sense in which he argues, I never said it; but I will tell you what I have said and what I do not hesitate to repeat to-day.  I have said that, as the Democrats believe that decision to be correct, and that the extension of slavery is affirmed in the National Constitution, they are bound to support it as such; and I will tell you here that General Jackson once said each man was bound to support the Constitution “as he understood it.”  Now, Judge Douglas understands the Constitution according to the Dred Scott decision, and he is bound to support it as he understands it.  I understand it another way, and therefore I am bound to support it in the way in which I understand it.  And as Judge Douglas believes that decision to be correct, I will remake that argument if I have time to do so.  Let me talk to some gentleman down there among you who looks me in the face.  We will say you are a member of the Territorial Legislature, and like Judge Douglas, you believe that the right to take and hold slaves there is a Constitutional right.  The first thing you do, is to swear you will support the Constitution and all rights guarantied therein; that you will, whenever your neighbor needs your legislation to support his Constitutional rights, not withhold that legislation.  If you withhold that necessary legislation for the support of the Constitution and Constitutional rights, do you not commit perjury?   I ask every sensible man, if that is not so?  That is undoubtedly just so, say what you please.  Now, that is precisely what Judge Douglas says, that this is a Constitutional right.  Does the Judge mean to say that the Territorial Legislature in legislating may, by withholding necessary laws, or by passing unfriendly laws, nullify that Constitutional right?  Does he mean to say that?  Does he mean to ignore the proposition so long and well established in law, that what you cannot do directly, you cannot do indirectly?  Does he mean that?  The truth about the matter is this: Judge Douglas has sung paeans to his “Popular Sovereignty” doctrine until his Supreme Court, co-operating with him, has squatted his Squatter Sovereignty out.  But he will keep up this species of humbuggery about Squatter Sovereignty.  He has at last invented this sort of do-nothing Sovereignty—that the people may exclude slavery by a sort of “Sovereignty” that is exercised by doing nothing at all.  Is not that running his Popular Sovereignty down awfully?  Has it not got down as thin as the homoeopathic soup that was made by boiling the shadow of a pigeon that had starved to death?  But at last, when it is brought to the test of close reasoning, there is not even that thin decoction of it left.  It is a presumption impossible in the domain of thought.  It is precisely no other than the putting of that most unphilosophical proposition, that two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time.  The Dred Scott decision covers the whole ground, and while it occupies it, there is no room even for the shadow of a starved pigeon to occupy the same ground. 

Judge Douglas, in reply to what I have said about having upon a previous occasion made the speech at Ottawa as the one he took an extract from, at Charleston, says it only shows that I practiced the deception twice.  Now, my friends, are any of you obtuse enough to swallow that?  Judge Douglas had said I had made a speech at Charleston that I would not make up north, and I turned around and answered him by showing I had made that same speech up north—had made it at Ottawa—made it in his hearing—made it in the Abolition District—in Lovejoy’s District—in the personal presence of Lovejoy himself—in the same atmosphere exactly in which I had made my Chicago speech, of which he complains so much. 

Now, in relation to my not having said any thing about the quotation from the Chicago speech: He thinks that is a terrible subject for me to handle.  Why, gentlemen, I can show you that the substance of the Chicago speech I delivered two years ago in “Egypt,” as he calls it.  It was down at Springfield.  That speech is here in this book, and I could turn to it and read it to you but for the lack of time.  I have not now the time to read it.  [“Read it, read it.”] No, gentlemen, I am obliged to use discretion in disposing most advantageously of my brief time.  The Judge has taken great exception to my adopting the heretical statement in the Declaration of Independence, that “all men are created equal,” and he has a great deal to say about negro equality.  I want to say that in sometimes alluding to the Declaration of Independence, I have only uttered the sentiments that Henry Clay used to hold.  Allow me to occupy your time a moment with what he said.  Mr. Clay was at one time called upon in Indiana, and in a way that I suppose was very insulting, to liberate his slaves, and he made a written reply to that application, and one portion of it is in these words:

“What is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana, to liberate the slaves under my care in Kentucky?  It is a general declaration in the act announcing to the world the independence of the thirteen American colonies, that ‘men are created equal.’  Now, as an abstract principle, there is no doubt of the truth of that declaration, and it is desirable in the original construction of society, and in organized societies, to keep it in view as a great fundamental principle.”

When I sometimes, in relation to the organization of new societies in new countries, where the soil is clean and clear, insisted that we should keep that principle in view, Judge Douglas will have it that I want a negro wife.  He never can be brought to understand that there is any middle ground on this subject.  I have lived until my fiftieth year, and have never had a negro woman either for a slave or a wife, and I think I can live fifty centuries, for that matter, without having had one for either.  I maintain that you may take Judge Douglas’s quotations from my Chicago speech, and from my Charleston speech, and the Galesburgh speech—in his speech of to-day, and compare them over, and I am willing to trust them with you upon his proposition that they show rascality or double-dealing.  I deny that they do. 

The Judge does not seem at all disposed to have peace, but I find he is disposed to have a personal warfare with me.  He says that my oath would not be taken against the bare word of Charles H. Lanphier or Thomas L. Harris.  Well, that is altogether a matter of opinion.  It is certainly not for me to vaunt my word against oaths of these gentlemen, but I will tell Judge Douglas again the facts upon which I “dared” to say they proved a forgery.  I pointed out at Galesburgh that the publication of these resolutions in the Illinois State Register could not have been the result of accident, as the proceedings of that meeting bore unmistakable evidence of being done by a man who knew it was a forgery; that it was a publication partly taken from the real proceedings of the Convention, and partly from the proceedings of a Convention at another place; which showed that he had the real proceedings before him, and taking one part of the resolutions, he threw out another part and substituted false and fraudulent ones in their stead.  I pointed that out to him, and also that his friend Lanphier, who was editor of the Register at that time and now is, must have known how it was done.  Now whether he did it or got some friend to do it for him, I could not tell, but he certainly knew all about it.  I pointed out to Judge Douglas that in his Freeport speech he had promised to investigate that matter.  Does he now say he did not make that promise?  I have a right to ask why he did not keep it?  I call upon him to tell here to-day why he did not keep that promise?  That fraud has been traced up so that it lies between him, Harris and Lanphier.  There is little room for escape for Lanphier.  Lanphier is doing the Judge good service, and Douglas desires his word to be taken for the truth.  He desires Lanphier to be taken as authority in what he states in his newspaper.  He desires Harris to be taken as a man of vast credibility, and when this thing lies among them, they will not press it to show where the guilt really belongs.  Now, as he has said that he would investigate it, and implied that he would tell us the result of his investigation, I demand of him to tell why he did not investigate it, if he did not; and if he did, why he won't tell the result.  I call upon him for that.

This is the third time that Judge Douglas has assumed that he learned about these resolutions by Harris’s attempting to use them against Norton on the floor of Congress.  I tell Judge Douglas the public records of the country show that he himself attempted it upon Trumbull a month before Harris tried them on Norton—that Harris had the opportunity of learning it from him, rather than he from Harris.  I now ask his attention to that part of the record on the case.  My friends, I am not disposed to detain you longer in regard to that matter. 

I am told that I still have five minutes left.  There is another matter I wish to call attention to.  He says, when he discovered there was a mistake in that case, he came forward magnanimously, without my calling his attention to it, and explained it.  I will tell you how he became so magnanimous.  When the newspapers of our side had discovered and published it, and put it beyond his power to deny it, then he came forward and made a virtue of necessity by acknowledging it.  Now he argues that all the point there was in those resolutions, although never passed at Springfield, is retained by their being passed at other localities.  Is that true?  He said I had a hand in passing them, in his opening speech—that I was in the Convention and helped to pass them.  Do the resolutions touch me at all?  It strikes me there is some difference between holding a man responsible for an act which he has not done, and holding him responsible for an act that he has done.  You will judge whether there is any difference in the “spots.”  And he has taken credit for great magnanimity in coming forward and acknowledging what is proved on him beyond even the capacity of Judge Douglas to deny, and he has more capacity in that way than any other living man. 

Then he wants to know why I won’t withdraw the charge in regard to a conspiracy to make slavery national, as he has withdrawn the one he made.  May it please his worship, I will withdraw it when it is proven false on me as that was proven false on him.  I will add a little more than that.  I will withdraw it whenever a reasonable man shall be brought to believe that the charge is not true.  I have asked Judge Douglas’s attention to certain matters of fact tending to prove the charge of a conspiracy to nationalize slavery, and he says he convinces me that this is all untrue because Buchanan was not in the country at that time, and because the Dred Scott case had not then got into the Supreme Court; and he says that I say the Democratic owners of Dred Scott got up the case.  I never did say that.  I defy Judge Douglas to show that I ever said so, for I never uttered it.  [One of Mr. Douglas’s reporters gesticulated affirmatively at Mr. Lincoln.]  I don’t care if your hireling does say I did, I tell you myself that I never said the “Democratic” owners of Dred Scott got up the case.  I have never pretended to know whether Dred Scott’s owners were Democrats or Abolitionists, or Freesoilers or Border Ruffians.  I have said that there is evidence about the case tending to show that it was a made up case, for the purpose of getting that decision.  I have said that that evidence was very strong in the fact that when Dred Scott was declared to be a slave, the owner of him made him free, showing that he had had the case tried and the question settled for such use as could be made of that decision; he cared nothing about the property thus declared to be his by that decision.  But my time is out and I can say no more.