MR. DOUGLAS'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I appear before you to-day in pursuance of a previous notice, and have made arrangements with Mr. Lincoln to divide time, and discuss with him the leading political topics that now agitate the country.

Prior to 1854 this country was divided into two great political parties known as Whig and Democratic.  These parties differed from each other on certain questions which were then deemed to be important to the best interests of the Republic.  Whig and Democrats differed about a bank, the tariff, distribution, the specie circular and the sub-treasury.  On those issues we went before the country and discussed the principles, objects and measures of the two great parties.  Each of the parties could proclaim its principles in Louisiana as well as in Massachusetts, in Kentucky as well as in Illinois.  Since that period, a great revolution has taken place in the formation of parties, by which they now seem to be divided by a geographical line, a large party in the North being arrayed under the Abolition or Republican banner, in hostility to the Southern States, Southern people, and Southern institutions.  It becomes important for us to inquire how this transformation of parties has occurred, made from those of national principles to geographical factions.  You remember that in 1850—this country was agitated from its center to its circumference about this slavery question—it became necessary for the leaders of the great Whig party and the leaders of the great Democratic party to postpone, for the time being, their particular disputes, and unite first to save the Union before they should quarrel as to the mode in which it was to be governed.  During the Congress of 1849—50, Henry Clay was the leader of the Union men, supported by Cass and Webster, and the leaders of the Democracy and the leaders of the Whigs, in opposition to Northern Abolitionists or Southern Disunionists.  That great contest of 1850 resulted in the establishment of the Compromise Measures of that year, which measures rested on the great principle that the people of each State and each Territory of this Union ought to be permitted to regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject to no other limitation than that which the Federal Constitution imposes. 

I now wish to ask you whether that principle was right or wrong which guarantied to every State and every community the right to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves.  These measures were adopted, as I have previously said, by the joint action of the Union Whigs and Union Democrats in opposition to Northern Abolitionists and Southern Disunionists.  In 1858, when the Whig party assembled at Baltimore, in National Convention for the last time, they adopted the principle of the Compromise Measures of 1850 as their rule of party action in the future.  One month thereafter the Democrats assembled at the same place to nominate a candidate for the Presidency, and declared the same great principle as the rule of action by which the Democracy would be governed.  The Presidential election of 1852 was fought on that basis.  It is true that the Whigs claimed special merit for the adoption of those measures, because they asserted that their great Clay originated them, their god-like Webster defended them and their Fillmore signed the bill making them the law of the land; but on the other hand, the Democrats claimed special credit for the Democracy, upon the ground that we gave twice as many votes in both Houses of Congress for the passage of these measures as the Whig party.

Thus you see that in the Presidential election of 1852, the Whigs were pledged by their platform and their candidate to the principle of the Compromise Measures of 1850, and the Democracy were likewise pledged by our principles, our platform, and our candidate to the same line of policy, to preserve peace and quiet between the different sections of this Union.  Since that period the Whig party has been transformed into a sectional party, under the name of the Republican party, whilst the Democratic party continues the same national party it was at that day.  All sectional men, all men of Abolition sentiments and principles, no matter whether they were old Abolitionists or had been Whigs or Democrats, rally under the sectional Republican banner, and consequently all national men, all Union-loving men, whether Whigs, Democrats, or by whatever name they have been known, ought to rally under the stars and stripes in defense of the Constitution as our fathers made it, and of the Union as it has existed under the Constitution. 

How has this departure from the faith of the Democracy and the faith of the Whig party been accomplished?  In 1854, certain restless, ambitious, and disappointed politicians throughout the land took advantage of the temporary excitement created by the Nebraska bill to try and dissolve the old Whig party and the old Democratic party, to abolitionize their members, and lead them, bound hand and foot, captives into the Abolition camp.  In the State of New York a Convention was held by some of these men and a platform adopted, every plank of which was as black as night, each one relating to the negro, and not one referring to the interests of the white man.  That example was followed throughout the Northern States, the effect being made to combine all the free States in hostile array against the slave States.  The men who thus thought that they could build up a great sectional party, and through its organization control the political destinies of this country, based all their hopes on the single fact that the North was the stronger division of the nation, and hence, if the North could be combined against the South, a sure victory awaited their efforts.  I am doing no more than justice to the truth of history when I say that in this State Abraham Lincoln, on behalf of the Whigs, and Lyman Trumbull, on behalf of the Democrats, were the leaders who undertook to perform this grand scheme of abolitionizing the two parties to which they belonged.  They had a private arrangement as to what should be the political destiny of each of the contracting parties before they went into the operation.  The arrangement was that Mr. Lincoln was to take the old line Whigs with him, claiming that he was still as good a Whig as ever, over to the Abolitionists, and Mr. Trumbull was to run for Congress in the Belleville District, and, claiming to be a good Democrat, coax the old Democrats into the Abolition camp, and when, by the joint efforts of the abolitionized Whigs, the abolitionized Democrats, and the old line Abolition and Freesoil party of this State, they should secure a majority in the Legislature.  Lincoln was then to be made United States Senator in Shields’s place, Trumbull remaining in Congress until I should be accommodating enough to die or resign, and give him a chance to follow Lincoln.  That was a very nice little bargain so far as Lincoln and Trumbull were concerned, if it had been carried out in good faith, and friend Lincoln had attained to Senatorial dignity according to the contract.  They went into the contest in every part of the State, calling upon all disappointed politicians to join in the crusade against the Democracy, and appealed to the prevailing sentiments and prejudices in all the northern counties of the State.  In three Congressional Districts in the north end of the State they adopted, as the platform of this new party thus formed by Lincoln and Trumbull in the connection with the Abolitionists, all of those principles which aimed at a warfare on the part of the North against the South.  They declared in that platform that the Wilmot Proviso was to be applied to all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of 36 deg.  30 min., and not only to all the territory we then had, but all that we might hereafter acquire; that hereafter no more slave States should be admitted into this Union, even if the people of such State desired slavery; that the Fugitive Slave law should be absolutely and unconditionally repealed; that slavery should be abolished in the District of Columbia; that the slave-trade should be abolished between the different States, and, in fact, every article in their creed related to this slavery question, and pointed to a Northern geographical party in hostility to the Southern States of this Union.  Such were their principles in Northern Illinois.  A little further South they became bleached and grew paler just in proportion as public sentiment moderated and changed in this direction.  They were Republicans or Abolitionists in the North, anti-Nebraska men down about Springfield, and in this neighborhood they contented themselves with talking about the inexpediency of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.  In the extreme northern counties they brought out men to canvass the State whose complexion suited their political creed, and hence Fred Douglass, the negro, was to be found there, following Gen. Cass, and attempting to speak on behalf of Lincoln, Trumbull and Abolitionism, against that illustrious Senator.  Why, they brought Fred Douglass to Freeport, when I was addressing a meeting there, in a carriage driven by the white owner, the negro sitting inside with the white lady and her daughter.  When I got through canvassing the northern counties that year, and progressed as far south as Springfield, I was met and opposed in discussion by Lincoln, Lovejoy, Trumbull, and Sidney Breese, who were on one side.  Father Giddings, the high-priest of Abolitionism, had just been there, and Chase came about the time I left.  [“Why didn’t you shoot him?”]  I did take a running shot at them, but as I was single-handed against the white, black and mixed drove, I had to use a shot-gun and fire into the crowd instead of taking them off singly with a rifle.  Trumbull had for his lieutenants, in aiding him to abolitionize the Democracy, such men as John Wentworth, of Chicago, Gov. Reynolds, of Belleville, Sidney Breese, of Carlisle, and John Dougherty, of Union, each of whom modified his opinions to suit the locality he was in.  Dougherty, for instance, would not go much further than to talk about the inexpediency of the Nebraska bill, whilst his allies at Chicago, advocated negro citizenship and negro equality, putting the white man and the negro on the same basis under the law.  Now these men, four years ago, were engaged in a conspiracy to breakdown the Democracy; to-day they are again acting together for the same purpose!  They do not hoist the same flag; they do not own the same principles, or profess the same faith; but conceal their union for the sake of policy.  In the northern counties, you find that all the Conventions are called in the name of the Black Republican party; at Springfield, they dare not call a Republican Convention, but invite all the enemies of the Democracy to unite, and when they get down into Egypt, Trumbull issues notices calling upon the “free Democracy” to assemble and hear him speak.  I have one of the handbills calling a Trumbull meeting at Waterloo the other day, which I received there, which is in the following language:

A meeting of the Free Democracy will take place in Waterloo, on Monday, Sept.  13th inst., whereat Hon. Lyman Trumbull, Hon. John Baker and others, will address the people upon the different political topics of the day.  Members of all parties are cordially invited to be present, and hear and determine for themselves.

                            THE MONROE FREE DEMOCRACY.

What is that name of “Free Democrats” put forth for unless to deceive the people, and make them believe that Trumbull and his followers are not the same party as that which raises the black flag of Abolitionism in the northern part of this State, and makes war upon the Democratic party throughout the State.  When I put that question to them at Waterloo on Saturday last, one of them rose and stated that they had changed their name for political effect in order to get votes.  There was a candid admission.  Their object in changing their party organization and principles in different localities was avowed to be an attempt to cheat and deceive some portion of the people until after the election.  Why cannot a political party that is conscious of the rectitude of its purposes and the soundness of its principles declare them every where alike?  I would disdain to hold any political principles that I could not avow in the same terms in Kentucky that I declared in Illinois, in Charleston as well as in Chicago, in New Orleans as well as in New York.  So long as we live under a Constitution common to all the States, our political faith ought to be as broad, as liberal, and just as that Constitution itself, and should be proclaimed alike in every portion of the Union.  But it is apparent that our opponents find it necessary, for partisan effect, to change their colors in different counties in order to catch the popular breeze, and hope with these discordant materials combined together to secure a majority in the Legislature for the purpose of putting down the Democratic party.  This combination did succeed in 1854 so far as to elect a majority of their confederates to the Legislature, and the first important act which they performed was to elect a Senator in the place of the eminent and gallant Senator Shields.  His term expired in the United States Senate at that time, and he had to be crushed by the Abolition coalition for the simple reason that he would not join in their conspiracy to wage war against one-half of the Union.  That was the only objection to General Shields.  He had served the people of the State with ability in the Legislature, he had served you with fidelity and ability as Auditor, he had performed his duties to the satisfaction of the whole country at the head of the Land Department at Washington, he had covered the State and the Union with immortal glory on the bloody fields of Mexico in defense of the honor of our flag, and yet he had to be stricken down by this unholy combination.  And for what cause?  Merely because he would not join a combination of one-half of the States to make war upon the other half, after having poured out his heart’s blood for all the States in the Union.  Trumbull was put in his place by Abolitionism.  How did Trumbull get there?  Before the Abolitionists would consent to go into an election for United States Senator they required all the members of this new combination to show their hands upon this question of Abolitionism.  Lovejoy, one of their high-priests, brought in resolutions defining the Abolition creed, and required them to commit themselves on it by their votes—yea or nay.  In that creed, as laid down by Lovejoy, they declared first, that the Wilmot Proviso must be put on all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of 36 deg.  30min., and that no more territory should ever be acquired unless slavery was at first prohibited therein; second, that no more States should ever be received into the Union unless slavery was first prohibited, by Constitutional provision, in such States; third, that the Fugitive Slave law must be immediately repealed, or, failing in that, then such amendments were to be made to it as would render it useless and inefficient for the objects for which it was passed, etc.  The next day after these resolutions were offered they were voted upon, part of them carried, and the others defeated, the same men who voted for them, with only two exceptions, voting soon after for Abraham Lincoln as their candidate for the United States Senate.  He came within one or two votes of being elected, but he could not quite get the number required, for the simple reason that his friend Trumbull, who was a party to the bargain by which Lincoln was to take Shields’s place, controlled a few abolitionized Democrats in the Legislature, and would not allow them all to vote for him, thus wronging Lincoln by permitting him on each ballot to be almost elected, but not quite, until he forced them to drop Lincoln and elect him (Trumbull), in order to unite the party.  Thus you find, that although the Legislature was carried that year by the bargain between Trumbull, Lincoln, and the Abolitionists, and the union of these discordant elements in one harmonious party; yet Trumbull violated his pledge, and played a Yankee trick on Lincoln when they came to divide the spoils.  Perhaps you would like a little evidence on this point if you would, I will call Col. James H. Matheny, of Springfield, to the stand, Mr. Lincoln’s especial confidential friend for the last twenty years, and see what he will say upon the subject, of this bargain.  Matheny is now the Black Republican or Abolition candidate for Congress in the Springfield District against the gallant Col. Harris, and is making speeches all over that part of the State against me and in favor of Lincoln, in concert with Trumbull.  He ought to be a good witness, and I will read an extract from a speech which he made in 1856, when he was mad because his friend Lincoln had been cheated.  It is one of numerous speeches of the same tenor that were made about that time, exposing this bargain between Lincoln, Trumbull and the Abolitionists.  Matheny then said:

“The Whigs, Abolitionists, Know Nothings and renegade Democrats made a solemn compact for the purpose of carrying this State against the Democracy, on this plan: 1st.  That they would all combine and elect Mr. Trumbull to Congress, and thereby carry his district for the Legislature, in order to throw all the strength that could be obtained into that body against the Democrats.  2d.  That when the Legislature should meet, the officers of that body, such as speaker, clerks, door-keepers, etc., would be given to the Abolitionists; and 3d.  That the Whigs were to have the United States Senator.  That, accordingly, in good faith, Trumbull was elected to Congress, and his district carried for the Legislature, and, when it convened, the Abolitionists got all the officers of that body, and thus far the “bond” was fairly executed.  The Whigs, on their part, demanded the election of Abraham Lincoln to the United States Senate, that the bond might be fulfilled, the other parties to the contract having already secured to themselves all that was called for.  But, in the most perfidious manner, they refused to elect Mr. Lincoln; and the mean, low-lived, sneaking Trumbull succeeded, by pledging all that was required by any party, in thrusting Lincoln aside and foisting himself, an excrescence from the rotten bowels of the Democracy, into the United States Senate; and thus it has ever been, that an honest man makes a bad bargain when he conspires or contracts with rogues.”

Matheny thought that his friend Lincoln made a bad bargain when he conspired and contracted with such rogues as Trumbull and his Abolition associates in that campaign.  Lincoln was shoved off the track, and he and his friends all at once began to mope; became sour and mad, and disposed to tell, but dare not; and thus they stood for a long time, until the Abolitionists coaxed and flattered him back by their assurances that he should certainly be a Senator in Douglas’s place.  In that way the Abolitionists have been enabled to hold Lincoln to the alliance up to this time, and now they have brought him into a fight against me, and he is to see if he is again to be cheated by them.  Lincoln this time, though, required more of them than a promise, and holds their bond, if not security, that Lovejoy shall not cheat him as Trumbull did.

When the Republican Convention assembled at Springfield, in June last, for the purpose of nominating State officers only, the Abolitionists could not get Lincoln and his friends into it until they would pledge themselves that Lincoln should be their candidate for the Senate; and you will find, in proof of this, that that Convention passed a resolution unanimously declaring that Abraham Lincoln was the “first, last and only choice” of the Republicans for United States Senator.  He was not willing to have it understood that he was merely their first choice, or their last choice, but their only choice.  The Black Republican party had nobody else.  Browning was nowhere; Gov. Bissell was of no account; Archie Williams was not to be taken into consideration; John Wentworth was not worth mentioning; John M. Palmer was degraded; and their party presented the extraordinary spectacle of having but one—the first, the last, and only choice for the Senate.  Suppose that Lincoln should die, what a horrible condition the Republican party would be in!  They would have nobody left.  They have no other choice, and it was necessary for them to put themselves before the world in this ludicrous, ridiculous attitude of having no other choice in order to quiet Lincoln’s suspicions, and assure him that he was not to be cheated by Lovejoy, and the trickery by which Trumbull outgeneraled him.  Well, gentlemen, I think they will have a nice time of it before they get through.  I do not intend to give them any chance to cheat Lincoln at all this time.  I intend to relieve him of all anxiety upon that subject, and spare them the mortification of more exposures of contracts violated, and the pledged honor of rogues forfeited.

But I wish to invite your attention to the chief points at issue between Mr. Lincoln and myself in this discussion.  Mr. Lincoln knowing that he was to be the candidate of his party on account of the arrangement of which I have already spoken, knowing that be was to receive the nomination of the Convention for the United States Senate, had his speech, accepting that nomination, all written and committed to memory, ready to be delivered the moment the nomination was announced.  Accordingly, when it was made, he was in readiness, and delivered his speech, a portion of which I will read, in order that I may state his political principles fairly, by repeating them in his own language:

“We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was instituted for the avowed object, and with the confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation; under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented.  I believe it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed.  ‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’  I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.  I do not expect the Union to be dissolved.  I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided.  It will become all one thing or all the other.  Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, North as well as South.”

There you have Mr. Lincoln’s first and main proposition, upon which he bases his claims, stated in his own language.  He tells you that this Republic cannot endure permanently divided into slave and free States, as our fathers made it.  He says that they must all become free or all become slave, that they must all be one thing or all be the other, or this Government cannot last.  Why can it not last, if we will execute the Government in the same spirit and upon the same principles upon which it is founded?  Lincoln, by his proposition, says to the South, “If you desire to maintain your institutions as they are now, you must not be satisfied with minding your own business, but you must invade Illinois and all the other Northern States, establish slavery in them, and make it universal;” and in the same language he says to the North, “You must not be content with regulating your own affairs, and minding your own business, but if you desire to maintain your freedom, you must invade the Southern States, abolish slavery there and every where, in order to have the States all one thing or all the other.”  I say that this is the inevitable and irresistible result of Mr. Lincoln’s argument, inviting a warfare between the North and the South, to be carried on with ruthless vengeance, until the one section or the other shall be driven to the wall, and become the victim of the rapacity of the other.  What good would follow such a system of warfare?  Suppose the North should succeed in conquering the South, how much would she be the gainer?  or suppose the South should conquer the North, could the Union be preserved in that way?  Is this sectional warfare to be waged between Northern States and Southern States until they all shall become uniform in their local and domestic institutions merely because Mr. Lincoln says that a house divided against itself cannot stand, and pretends that this scriptural quotation, this language of our Lord and Master, is applicable to the American Union and the American Constitution?  Washington and his compeers, in the Convention that framed the Constitution, made this Government divided into free and slave States.  It was composed then of thirteen sovereign and independent States, each having sovereign authority over its local and domestic institutions, and all bound together by the Federal Constitution.  Mr. Lincoln likens that bond of the Federal Constitution, joining free and slave States together, to a house divided against itself, and says that it is contrary to the law of God and cannot stand.  When did he learn, and by what authority does he proclaim, that this Government is contrary to the law of God and cannot stand?  It has stood thus divided into free and slave States from its organization up to this day.  During that period we have increased from four millions to thirty millions of people; we have extended our territory from the Mississippi to the Pacific ocean; we have acquired the Floridas and Texas, and other territory sufficient to double our geographical extent; we have increased in population, in wealth, and in power beyond any example on earth; we have risen from a weak and feeble power to become the terror and admiration of the civilized world; and all this has been done under a Constitution which Mr. Lincoln, in substance, says is in violation of the law of God, and under a Union divided into free and slave States, which Mr. Lincoln thinks, because of such division, can not stand.  Surely, Mr. Lincoln is a wiser man than those who framed the Government.  Washington did not believe, nor did his compatriots, that the local laws and domestic institutions that were well adapted to the Green Mountains of Vermont were suited to the rice plantations of South Carolina; they did not believe at that day that in a Republic so broad and expanded as this, containing such a variety of climate, soil, and interest, that uniformity in the local laws and domestic institutions was either desirable or possible.  They believed then as our experience has proved to us now, that each locality, having different interests, a different climate and different surroundings, required different local laws, local policy and local institutions, adapted to the wants of that locality.  Thus our Government was formed on the principle of diversity in the local institutions and laws, and not on that of uniformity.

As my time flies, I can only glance at these points and not present them as fully as I would wish, because I desire to bring all the points in controversy between the two parties before you in order to have Mr. Lincoln’s reply.  He makes war on the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case known as the Dred Scott case.  I wish to say to you, fellow-citizens, that I have no war to make on that decision, or any other ever rendered by the Supreme Court.  I am content to take that decision as it stands delivered by the highest judicial tribunal on earth, a tribunal established by the Constitution of the United States for that purpose, and hence that decision becomes the law of the land, binding on you, on me, and on every other good citizen, whether we like it or not.  Hence I do not choose to go into an argument to prove, before this audience, whether or not Chief Justice Taney understood the law better than Abraham Lincoln.

Mr. Lincoln objects to that decision, first and mainly because it deprives the negro of the rights of citizenship.  I am as much opposed to his reason for that objection as I am to the objection itself.  I hold that a negro is not and never ought to be a citizen of the United States.  I hold that this Government was made on the white basis, by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men and none others.  I do not believe that the Almighty made the negro capable of self-government.  I am aware that all the Abolition lecturers that you find traveling about through the country, are in the habit of reading the Declaration of Independence to prove that all men were created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Mr. Lincoln is very much in the habit of following in the track of Lovejoy in this particular, by reading that part of the Declaration of Independence to prove that the negro was endowed by the Almighty with the inalienable right of equality with white men.  Now, I say to you, my fellow-citizens, that in my opinion, the signers of the Declaration had no reference to the negro whatever, when they declared all men to be created equal.  They desired to express by that phrase white men, men of European birth and European descent, and had no reference either to the negro, the savage Indians, the Fejee, the Malay, or any other inferior and degraded race, when they spoke of the equality of men.  One great evidence that such was their understanding, is to be found in the fact that at that time every one of the thirteen colonies was a slaveholding colony, every signer of the Declaration represented a slaveholding constituency, and we know that no one of them emancipated his slaves, much less offered citizenship to them when they signed the Declaration; and yet, if they intended to declare that the negro was the equal of the white man, and entitled by divine right to an equality with him, they were bound, as honest men, that day and hour to have put their negroes on an equality with themselves.  Instead of doing so, with uplifted eyes to heaven they implored the divine blessing upon them, during the seven years’ bloody war they had to fight to maintain that Declaration, never dreaming that they were violating divine law by still holding the negroes in bondage and depriving them of equality.

My friends, I am in favor of preserving this Government as our fathers made it.  It does not follow by any means that because a negro is not your equal or mine, that hence he must necessarily be a slave.  On the contrary, it does follow that we ought to extend to the negro every right, every privilege, every immunity which he is capable of enjoying, consistent with the good of society.  When you ask me what these rights are, what their nature and extent is, I tell you that that is a question which each State of this Union must decide for itself.  Illinois has already decided the question.  We have decided that the negro must not be a slave within our limits, but we have also decided that the negro shall not be a citizen within our limits; that he shall not vote, hold office, or exercise any political rights.  I maintain that Illinois, as a sovereign State, has a right thus to fix her policy with reference to the relation between the white man and the negro; but while we had that right to decide the question for ourselves, we must recognize the same right in Kentucky and in every other State to make the same decision, or a different one.  Having decided our own policy with reference to the black race, we must leave Kentucky and Missouri and every other State perfectly free to make just such a decision as they see proper on that question.

Kentucky has decided that question for herself.  She has said that within her limits a negro shall not exercise any political rights, and she has also said that a portion of the negroes under the laws of that State shall be slaves.  She had as much right to adopt that as her policy as we had to adopt the contrary for our policy.  New York has decided that in that State a negro may vote if he has $250 worth of property, and if he owns that much he may vote upon an equality with the white man.  I, for one, am utterly opposed to negro suffrage any where and under any circumstances: yet, inasmuch as the Supreme Court have decided in  the celebrated Dred Scott case that a State has a right to confer the privilege of voting upon free negroes, I am not going to make war upon New York because she has adopted a policy repugnant to my feelings.  But New York must mind her own business, and keep her negro suffrage to herself, and not attempt to force it upon us.

In the State of Maine they have decided that a negro may vote and hold office on an equality with a white man.  I had occasion to say to the Senators from Maine, in a discussion last session, that if they thought that the white people within the limits of their State were no better than negroes, I would not quarrel with them for it, but they must not say that my white constituents of Illinois were no better than negroes, or we would be sure to quarrel.

The Dred Scott decision covers the whole question, and declares that each State has the right to settle this question of suffrage for itself, and all questions as to the relations between the white man and the negro.  Judge Taney expressly lays down the doctrine.  I receive it as law, and I say that while those States are adopting regulations on that subject disgusting and abhorrent, according to my views, I will not make war on them if they will mind their own business and let us alone.

I now come back to the question, why cannot this Union exist forever divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it?  It can thus exist if each State will carry out the principles upon which our institutions were founded, to wit: the right of each State to do as it pleases, without meddling with its neighbors.  Just act upon that great principle, and this Union will not only live forever, but it will extend and expand until it covers the whole continent, and makes this confederacy one grand, ocean-bound Republic.  We must bear in mind that we are yet a young nation, growing with a rapidity unequaled in the history of the world, that our national increase is great, and that the emigration from the old world is increasing, requiring us to expand and acquire new territory from time to time, in order to give our people land to live upon.  If we live upon the principle of State rights and State sovereignty, each State regulating its own affairs and minding its own business, we can go on and extend indefinitely, just as fast and as far as we need the territory.  The time may come, indeed has now come, when our interests would be advanced by the acquisition of the Island of Cuba.  When we get Cuba we must take it as we find it, leaving the people to decide the question of slavery for themselves, without interference on the part of the Federal Government, or of any State of this Union.  So, when it becomes necessary to acquire any portion of Mexico or Canada, or of this continent or the adjoining islands, we must take them as we find them, leaving the people free to do as they please—to have slavery or not, as they choose.  I never have inquired and never will inquire whether a new State, applying for admission, has slavery or not for one of her institutions.  If the Constitution that is presented be the act and deed of the people, and embodies their will, and they have the requisite population, I will admit them with slavery or without it, just as that people shall determine.  My objection to the Lecompton Constitution did not consist in the fact that it made Kansas a slave State.  I would have been as much opposed to its admission under such a Constitution as a free State as I was opposed to its admission under it as a slave State.  I hold that that was a question which that people had a right to decide for themselves, and that no power on earth ought to have interfered with that decision.  In my opinion, the Lecompton Constitution was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and did not embody their will, and the recent election in that Territory, at which it was voted down by nearly ten to one, shows conclusively that I was right in saying, when the Constitution was presented, that it was not the act and deed of the people, and did not embody their will.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: There is very much in the principles that Judge Douglas has here enunciated that I most cordially approve, and over which I shall have no controversy with him.  In so far as he has insisted that all the States have the right to do exactly as they please about all their domestic relations, including that of slavery, I agree entirely with him.  He places me wrong in spite of all I can tell him, though I repeat it again and again, insisting that I have no difference with him upon this subject.  I have made a great many speeches, some of which have been printed, and it will be utterly impossible for him to find any thing that I have ever put in print contrary to what I now say upon this subject.  I hold myself under constitutional obligations to allow the people in all the States, without interference, direct or indirect, to do exactly as they please, and I deny that I have any inclination to interfere with them, even if there were no such constitutional obligation.  I can only say again that I am placed improperly—altogether improperly, in spite of all I can say—when it is insisted that I entertain any other view or purposes in regard to that matter.

While I am upon this subject, I will make some answers briefly to certain propositions that Judge Douglas has put.  He says, “Why can’t this Union endure permanently, half slave and half free?”  I have said that I supposed it could not, and I will try, before this new audience, to give briefly some of the reasons for entertaining that opinion.  Another form of his question is, “Why can’t we let it stand as our fathers placed it?”  That is the exact difficulty between us.  I say, that Judge Douglas and his friends have changed them from the position in which our fathers originally placed it.  I say, in the way our fathers originally left the slavery question, the institution was in the course of ultimate extinction, and the public mind rested in the helief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.  I say when this Government was first established, it was the policy of its founders to prohibit the spread of slavery into the new Territories of the United States, where it had not existed.  But Judge Douglas and his friends have broken up that policy, and placed it upon a new basis by which it is to become national and perpetual.  All I have asked or desired any where is that it should be placed back again upon the basis that the fathers of our Government originally placed it upon.  I have no doubt that it would become extinct, for all time to come, if we but readopted the policy of the fathers by restricting it to the limits it has already covered—restricting it from the new Territories.

I do not wish to dwell at great length on this branch of the subject at this time, but allow me to repeat one thing that I have stated before.  Brooks, the man who assaulted Senator Sumner on the floor of the Senate, and who was complimented with dinners, and silver pitchers, and gold-headed canes, and a good many other things for that feat, in one of his speeches declared that when this Government was originally established, nobody expected that the institution of slavery would last until this day.  That was but the opinion of one man, but it was such an opinion as we can never get from Judge Douglas or anybody in favor of slavery in the North at all.  You can sometimes get it from a Southern man.  He said at the same time that the framers of our Government did not have the knowledge that experience has taught us—that experience and the invention of the cotton-gin have taught us that the perpetuation of slavery is a necessity.  He insisted, therefore, upon its being changed from the basis upon which the fathers of the Government left it to the basis of its perpetuation and nationalization. 

I insist that this is the difference between Judge Douglas and myself—that Judge Douglas is helping that change along.  I insist upon this Government being placed where our fathers originally placed it.

I remember Judge Douglas once said that he saw the evidences on the statute books of Congress, of a policy in the origin of Government to divide slavery and freedom by a geographical line—that he saw an indisposition to maintain that policy, and therefore he set about studying up a way to settle the institution on the right basis—the basis which he thought it ought to have been placed upon at first; and in that speech he confesses that he seeks to place it, not upon the basis that the fathers placed it upon, but upon one gotten up on “original principles.”  When he asks me why we cannot get along with it in the attitude where our fathers placed it, he had better clear up the evidences that he has himself changed it from that basis; that he has himself been chiefly instrumental in changing the policy of the fathers.  Any one who will read his speech of the 22d of last March, will see that he there makes an open confession, showing that he set about fixing the institution upon an altogether different set of principles.  I think I have fully answered him when he asks me why we cannot let it alone upon the basis where our fathers left it, by showing that he has himself changed the whole policy of the Government in that regard.

Now, fellow-citizens, in regard to this matter about a contract that was made between Judge Trumbull and myself, and all that long portion of Judge Douglas’s speech on this subject—I wish simply to say what I have said to him before, that he cannot know whether it is true or not, and I do know that there is not a word of truth in it.  And I have told him so before.  I don’t want any harsh language indulged in, but I do not know how to deal with this persistent insisting on a story that I know to be utterly without truth.  It used to be a fashion amongst men that when a charge was made, some sort of proof was brought forward to establish it, and if no proof was found to exist, the charge was dropped.  I don’t know how to meet this kind of an argument.  I don’t want to have a fight with Judge Douglas, and I have no way of making an argument up into the consistency of a corn-cob and stopping his mouth with it.  All I can do is, good-humoredly to say that, from the beginning to the end of all that story about a bargain between Judge Trumbull and myself, there is not a word of truth in it.  I can only ask him to show some sort of evidence of the truth of his story.  He brings forward here and reads from what he contends is a speech by James H. Matheny, charging such a bargain between Trumbull and myself.  My own opinion is that Matheny did do some such immoral thing as to tell a story that he knew nothing about.  I believe he did.  I contradicted it instantly, and it has been contradicted by Judge Trumbull, while nobody has produced any proof, because there is none.  Now, whether the speech which the Judge brings forward here is really the one Matheny made I do not know, and I hope the Judge will pardon me for doubting the genuineness of this document, since his production of those Springfield resolutions at Ottawa.  I do not wish to dwell at any great length upon this matter.  I can say nothing when a long story like this is told, except it is not true, and demand that he who insists upon it shall produce some proof.  That is all any man can do, and I leave it in that way, for I know of no other way of dealing with it.

The Judge has gone over a long account of the old Whig and Democratic parties, and it connects itself with this charge against Trumbull and myself.  He says that they agreed upon a compromise in regard to the slavery question in 1850; that in a National Democratic Convention resolutions were passed to abide by that compromise as a finality upon the slavery question.  He also says that the Whig party in National Convention agreed to abide by and regard as a finality the Compromise of 1850.  I understand the Judge to be altogether right about that; I understand that part of the history of the country as stated by him to be correct.  I recollect that I, as a member of that party, acquiesced in that compromise.  I recollect in the Presidential election which followed, when we had General Scott up for the Presidency, Judge Douglas was around berating us Whigs as Abolitionists, precisely as he does to-day—not a bit of difference.  I have often heard him.  We could do nothing when the old Whig party was alive that was not Abolitionism, but it has got an extremely good name since it has passed away.

When that Compromise was made it did not repeal the old Missouri Compromise.  It left a region of United States territory half as large as the present territory of the United States, north of the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, in which slavery was prohibited by act of Congress.  This compromise did not repeal that one.  It did not affect or propose to repeal it.  But at last it became Judge Douglas’s duty, as he thought (and I find no fault with him), as Chairman of the Committee on Territories, to bring in a bill for the organization of a Territorial Government—first of one, then of two Territories north of that line.  When he did so it ended in his inserting a provision substantially repealing the Missouri Compromise.  That was because the Compromise of 1850 had not repealed it.  And now I ask why he could not have let that compromise alone?  We were quiet from the agitation of the slavery question.  We were making no fuss about it.  All had acquiesced in the Compromise measures of 1850.  We never had been seriously disturbed by any abolition agitation before that period.  When he came to form governments for the Territories north of the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, why could he not have let that matter stand as it was standing?  Was it necessary to the organization of a Territory?  Not at all.  Iowa lay north of the line and had been organized as a Territory and come into the Union as a State without disturbing that Compromise.  There was no sort of necessity for destroying it to organize these Territories.  But, gentlemen, it would take up all my time to meet all the little quibbling arguments of Judge Douglas to show that the Missouri Compromise was repealed by the Compromise of 1850.  My own opinion is, that a careful investigation of all the arguments to sustain the position that that Compromise was virtually repealed by the Compromise of 1850, would show that they are the merest fallacies.  I have the Report that Judge Douglas first brought into Congress at the time of the introduction of the Nebraska bill, which in its original form did not repeal the Missouri Compromise, and he there expressly stated that he had forborne to do so because it had not been done by the Compromise of 1850.  I close this part of the discussion on my part by asking him the question again,  “Why, when we had peace under the Missouri Compromise, could you not have let it alone?”

In complaining of what I said in my speech at Springfield, in which he says I accepted my nomination for the Senatorship (where, by the way, he is at fault, for if he will examine it, he will find no acceptance in it), he again quotes that portion in which I said that “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” Let me say a word in regard to that matter.

He tries to persuade us that there must be a variety in the different institutions of the States of the Union; that that variety necessarily proceeds from the variety of soil, climate, of the face of the country, and the difference in the natural feature of the States.  I agree to all that.  Have these very matters ever produced any difficulty amongst us?  Not at all.  Have we ever had any quarrel over the fact that they have laws in Louisiana designed to regulate the commerce that springs from the production of sugar?  Or because we have a different class relative to the production of flour in this State?  Have they produced any differences?  Not at all.  They are the very cements of this Union.  They don’t make the house a house divided against itself.  They are the props that hold up the house and sustain the Union.

But has it been so with this element of slavery?  Have we not always had quarrels and difficulties over it?  And when will we cease to have quarrels over it?  Like causes produce like effects.  It is worth while to observe that we have generally had comparative peace upon the slavery question, and that there has been [just] cause for alarm until it was excited by the effort to spread it into new territory.  Whenever it has been limited to its present bounds, and there has been no effort to spread it, there has been peace.  All the trouble and convulsion has proceeded from efforts to spread it over more territory.  It was thus at the date of the Missouri Compromise.  It was so again with the annexation of Texas; so with the territory acquired by the Mexican war, and it is so now.  Whenever there has been an effort to spread it there has been agitation and resistance.  Now, I appeal to this audience (very few of whom are my political friends), as national men, whether we have reason to expect that the agitation in regard to this subject will cease while the causes that tend to reproduce agitation are actively at work?  Will not the same cause that produced agitation in 1820, when the Missouri Compromise was formed—that which produced the agitation upon the annexation of Texas, and at other times—work out the same results always?  Do you think that the nature of man will be changed—that the same causes that produced agitation at one time will not have the same effect at another?

This has been the result so far as my observation of the slavery question and my reading in history extends.  What right have we then to hope that the trouble will cease—that the agitation will come to an end—until it shall either be placed back where it originally stood, and where the fathers originally placed it, or, on the other hand, until it shall entirely master all opposition?  This is the view I entertain, and this is the reason why I entertained it, as Judge Douglas has read from my Springfield speech.

Now, my friends, there is one other thing that I feel myself under some sort of obligation to mention.  Judge Douglas has here to-day—in a very rambling way, I was about saying—spoken of the platforms for which he seeks to hold me responsible.  He says, “Why can’t you come out and make an open avowal of principles in all places alike?” and he reads from an advertisement that he says was used to notify the people of a speech to be made by Judge Trumbull at Waterloo.  In commenting on it he desires to know whether we cannot speak frankly and manfully as he and his friends do!  How, I ask, do his friends speak out their own sentiments?  A Convention of his party in this State met on the 21st of April, at Springfield, and passed a set of resolutions which they proclaim to the country as their platform.  This does constitute their platform, and it is because Judge Douglas claims it is his platform—that these are his principles and purposes—that he has a right to declare he speaks his sentiments “frankly and manfully.”  On the 9th of June, Col.  John Dougherty, Gov. Reynolds and others, calling themselves National Democrats, met in Springfield and adopted a set of resolutions which are as easily understood, as plain and as definite in stating to the country and to the world what they believed in and would stand upon, as Judge Douglas’s platform.  Now, what is the reason, that Judge Douglas is not willing that Col. Dougherty and Gov. Reynolds should stand upon their own written and printed platform as well as he upon his?  Why must he look farther than their platform when he claims himself to stand by his platform?  Again, in reference to our platform: On the 16th of June the Republicans had their Convention and published their platform, which is as clear and distinct as Judge Douglas’s.  In it they spoke their principles as plainly and as definitely to the world.  What is the reason that Judge Douglas is not willing I should stand upon that platform?  Why must he go around hunting for some one who is supporting me, or has supported me at some time in his life, and who has said something at some time contrary to that platform?  Does the Judge regard that rule as a good one?  If it turn out that the rule is a good one for me—that I am responsible for any and every opinion that any man has expressed who is my friend—then it is a good rule for him.  I ask, is it not as good a rule for him as it is for me?  In my opinion, it is not a good rule for either of us.  Do you think differently, Judge?

Mr. Douglas—“I do not.”

Mr. Lincoln—Judge Douglas says he does not think differently.  I am glad of it.  Then can he tell me why he is looking up resolutions of five or six years ago, and insisting that they were my platform, notwithstanding my protest that they are not, and never were my platform, and my pointing out the platform of the State Convention which he delights to say nominated me for the Senate?  I cannot see what he means by parading these resolutions, if it is not to hold me responsible for them in some way.  If he says to me here, that he does not hold the rule to be good, one way or the other, I do not comprehend how he could answer me more fully if he answered me at greater length.  I will therefore put in as my answer to the resolutions that he has hunted up against me, what I, as a lawyer, would call a good plea to a bad declaration.  I understand that it is a maxim of law, that a poor plea maybe a good plea to a bad declaration.  I think that the opinions the Judge brings from those who support me, yet differ from me, is a bad declaration against me; but if I can bring the same things against him, I am putting in a good plea to that kind of declaration, and now I propose to try it.

At Freeport Judge Douglas occupied a large part of his time in producing resolutions and documents of various sorts, as I understood, to make me somehow responsible for them; and I propose now doing a little of the same sort of thing for him.  In 1850 a very clever gentleman by the name of Thompson Campbell, a personal friend of Judge Douglas and myself, a political friend of Judge Douglas and opponent of mine, was a candidate for Congress in the Galena District.  He was interrogated as to his views on this same slavery question.  I have here before me the interrogatories and Campbell’s answers to them.  I will read them:

INTERROGATORIES.

1st.  Will you, if elected, vote for and cordially support a bill prohibiting slavery in the Territories of the United States?

2d.  Will you vote for and support a bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia?

3d.  Will you oppose the admission of any slave States which may be formed out of Texas or the Territories?

4th.  Will you vote for and advocate the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law passed at the recent session of Congress?

5th.  Will you advocate and vote for the election of a Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall be willing to organize the committee of that House so as to give the free States their just influence in the business of legislation?

6th.  What are your views, not only as to the constitutional right of Congress to prohibit the slave-trade between the States, but also as to the expediency of exercising that right immediately?

CAMPBELL’S REPLY.

To the first and second interrogatories, I answer unequivocally in the affirmative.

To the third interrogatory I reply, that I am opposed to the admission of any more slave States into the Union, that may be formed out of Texan or any other Territory.

To the fourth and fifth interrogatories I unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative.

To the sixth interrogatory I reply, that so long as the slave States continue to treat slaves as articles of commerce, the Constitution confers power on Congress to pass laws regulating that peculiar COMMERCE, and that the protection of Human Rights imperatively demands the interposition of every constitutional means to prevent this most inhuman and iniquitous traffic.

I want to say here that Thompson Campbell was elected to Congress on that platform, as the Democratic candidate in the Galena District, against Martin P. Sweet.

Judge Douglas—“Give me the date of the letter.” 

Mr. Lincoln—The time Campbell ran was in 1850.  I have not the exact date here.  It was some time in 1850 that these interrogatories were put and the answer given.  Campbell was elected to Congress, and served out his term.  I think a second election came up before he served out his term and he was not re-elected.  Whether defeated or not nominated, I do not know.  [Mr. Campbell was nominated for re-election by the Democratic party, by acclamation.]  At the end of his term his very good friend, Judge Douglas, got him a high office from President Pierce, and sent him off to California.  Is not that the fact?  Just at the end of his term in Congress it appears that our mutual friend Judge Douglas got our mutual friend Campbell a good office, and sent him to California upon it.  And not only so, but on the 27th of last month, when Judge Douglas and myself spoke at Freeport in joint discussion, there was his same friend Campbell, come all the way from California, to help the Judge beat me; and there was poor Martin P. Sweet standing on the platform, trying to help poor me to be elected.  That is true of one of Judge Douglas’s friends.

So again, in that same race of 1850, there was a Congressional Convention assembled at Joliet, and it nominated K. S. Molony for Congress, and unanimously adopted the following resolution: 

Resolved, That we are uncompromisingly opposed to the extension of slavery; and while we would not make such opposition a ground of interference with the interests of the States where it exists, yet we moderately but firmly insist that it is the duty of Congress to oppose its extension into Territory now free, by all means compatible with the obligations of the Constitution, and with good faith to our sister States; that these principles were recognized by the Ordinance of 1787, which received the sanction of Thomas Jefferson, who is acknowledged by all to be the great oracle and expounder of our faith.

Subsequently the same interrogatories were propounded to Dr. Molony which had been addressed to Campbell, as above, with the exception of the 6th, respecting the inter-State slave-trade, to which Dr. Molony, the Democratic nominee for Congress, replied as follows:

I received the written interrogatories this day, and as you will see by the La Salle Democrat and Ottawa Free Trader, I took at Peru on the 5th and at Ottawa on the 7th, the affirmative side of interrogatories 1st and 2d, and in relation to the admission of any more slave States from free Territory, my position taken at these meetings, as correctly reported in said papers, was emphatically and distinctly opposed to it.  In relation to the admission of any more slave States from Texas, whether I shall go against it or not will depend upon the opinion that I may hereafter form of the true meaning and nature of the resolutions of annexation.  If, by said resolutions, the honor and good faith of the nation is pledged to admit more slave States from Texas when she (Texas) may apply for the admission of such State, then I should, if in Congress, vote for their admission.  But if not so pledged and bound by sacred contract, then a bill for the admission of more slave States from Texas would never receive my vote.

To your fourth interrogatory I answer most decidedly in the affirmative, and for reasons set forth in my reported remarks at Ottawa last Monday.

To your fifth interrogatory I also reply in the affirmative most cordially, and that I will use my utmost exertions to secure the nomination and election of a man who will accomplish the objects of said interrogatories.  I most cordially approve of the resolutions adopted at the union meeting held at Princeton on the 27th September ult.                                                            Yours, etc.,

K.  S.  MOLONY.

All I have to say in regard to Dr. Molony is, that he was the regularly nominated Democratic candidate for Congress in his district—was elected at that time, at the end of his term was appointed to a land-office at Danville.  (I never heard any thing of Judge Douglas’s instrumentality in this.)  He held this office a considerable time, and when we were at Freeport the other day, there were handbills scattered about notifying the public that after our debate was over, R.  S.  Molony would make a Democratic speech in favor of Judge Douglas.  That is all I know of my own personal knowledge.  It is added here to this resolution, and truly I believe, that—

“Among those who participated in the Joliet Convention, and who supported its nominee, with his platform as laid down in the resolution of the Convention and in his reply as above given, we call at random the following names, all of which are recognized at this day as leading Democrats:

“Cook County—E.  B.  Williams, Charles McDonell, Arno Voss, Thomas Hoyne, Isaac Cook.”

I reckon we ought to except Cook.

“F.  C.  Sherman.” 

“Will—Joel A.  Matteson, S.  W.  Bowen.”

“Kane—B. F. Hall, G. W. Renwick, A.  M. Herrington, Elijah Wilcox.”

“McHenry—W. M. Jackson, Enos W. Smith, Neil Donnelly.”

“La Salle—John Hise, William Reddick.” 

William Reddick!  another one of Judge Douglas’s friends that stood on the stand with him at Ottawa, at the time the Judge says my knees trembled so that I had to be carried away.  The names are all here: 

“DuPage—Nathan Allen.”

“DeKalb—Z. B. Mayo.”

Here is another set of resolutions which I think are apposite to the matter in hand.

On the 28th of February of the same year, a Democratic District Convention was held at Naperville, to nominate a candidate for Circuit Judge.  Among the delegates were Bowcn and Kelly, of Will; Captain Naper, H. H. Cody, Nathan Allen, of DuPage; W. M. Jackson, J. M. Strode, P. W. Piatt and Enos W. Smith, of McHenry; J. Horsman and others, of Winnebago.  Col. Strode presided over the Convention.  The following resolutions were unanimously adopted—the first on motion of P. W. Piatt, the second on motion of William M. Jackson:

Resolved, That this Convention is in favor of the Wilmot Proviso, both in Principle and Practice, and that we know of no good reason why any person should oppose the largest latitude in Free Soil, Free Territory and Free Speech.

Resolved, That in the opinion of the Convention, the time has arrived when all men should be free, whites as well as others.

Judge Douglas—“What is the date of those resolutions?”

Mr. Lincoln—I understand it was in 1850, but I do not know it.  I do not state a thing and say I know it, when I do not.  But I have the highest belief that this is so.  I know of no way to arrive at the conclusion that there is an error in it.  I mean to put a case no stronger than the truth will allow.  But what I was going to comment upon is an extract from a newspaper in DeKalb county, and it strikes me as being rather singular, I confess, under the circumstances.  There is a Judge Mayo in that county, who is a candidate for the Legislature, for the purpose, if he secures his election, of helping to re-elect Judge Douglas.  He is the editor of a newspaper [DeKalb County Sentinel], and in that paper I find the extract I am going to read.  It is part of an editorial article in which he was electioneering as fiercely as he could for Judge Douglas and against me.  It was a curious thing, I think, to be in such a paper.  I will agree to that, and the Judge may make the most of it:

“Our education has been such, that we have ever been rather in favor of the equality of the blacks; that is, that they should enjoy all the privileges of the whites where they reside.  We are aware that this is not a very popular doctrine.  We have had many a confab with some who are now strong ‘Republicans,’ we taking the broad ground of equality and they the opposite ground.

“We were brought up in a State where blacks were voters, and we do not know of any inconvenience resulting from it, though perhaps it would not work as well where the blacks are more numerous.  We have no doubt of the right, of the whites to guard against such an evil, if it is one.  Our opinion is that it would be best for all concerned to have the colored population in a State by themselves [in this I agree with him]; but if within the jurisdiction of the United States, we say by all means they should have the right to have their Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to vote for President.  With us ‘worth makes the man, and want of it the fellow.’ We have seen many a ‘nigger’ that we thought more of than some white men.”

That is one of Judge Douglas’s friends.  Now I do not want to leave myself in an attitude where I can be misrepresented, so I will say I do not think the Judge is responsible for this article; but he is quite as responsible for it as I would be if one of my friends had said it.  I think that is fair enough. 

I have here also a set of resolutions parsed by a Democratic State Convention in Judge Douglas’s own good old State of Vermont, that I think ought to be good for him too:

Resolved, That liberty is a right inherent and inalienable in man and that herein all men are equal. 

Resolved, That we claim no authority in the Federal Government to abolish slavery in the several Slates, but we do claim for it Constitutional power perpetually to prohibit the introduction of slavery into territory now free, and abolish it wherever, under the jurisdiction of Congress, it exists.

Resolved, That no more slave States should be admitted into the Federal Union.

Resolved, That the Government ought to return to its ancient policy, not to extend, nationalize or encourage, but to limit, localize and discourage slavery.

At Freeport I answered several interrogatories that had been propounded to me by Judge Douglas at the Ottawa meeting.  The Judge has yet not seen fit to find any fault with the position that I took in regard to those seven interrogatories, which were certainly broad enough, in all conscience, to cover the entire ground.  In my answers, which have been printed, and all have had the opportunity of seeing, I take the ground that those who elect me must expect that I will do nothing which will not be in accordance with those answers.  I have some right to assert that Judge Douglas has no fault to find with them.  But he chooses to still try to thrust me upon different ground without paying any attention to my answers, the obtaining of which from me cost him so much trouble and concern.  At the same time, I propounded four interrogatories to him, claiming it as a right that he should answer as many interrogatories for me as I did for him, and I would reserve myself for a future installment when I got them ready.  The Judge in answering me upon that occasion, put in what I suppose he intends as answers to all four of my interrogatories.  The first one of these interrogatories I have before me, and it is in these words:

“Question 1.  If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State Constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite number of inhabitants according to the English bill—some ninety-three thousand—will you vote to admit them?” 

As I read the Judge’s answer in the newspaper, and as I remember it as pronounced at the time, he does not give any answer which is equivalent to yes or no—I will or I wont.  He answers at very considerable length, rather quarreling with me for asking the question, and insisting that Judge Trumbull had done something that I ought to say something about; and finally getting out such statements as induce me to infer that he means to be understood he will, in that supposed case, vote for the admission of Kansas.  I only bring this forward now for the purpose of saying that if he chooses to put a different construction upon his answer he may do it.  But if he does not, I shall from this time forward assume that he will vote for the admission of Kansas in disregard of the English bill.  He has the right to remove any misunderstanding I may have.  I only mention it now that I may hereafter assume this to be the true construction of his answer, if he does not now choose to correct me.

The second interrogatory that I propounded to him, was this:

“Question 2.  Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?”

To this Judge Douglas answered that they can lawfully exclude slavery from the Territory prior to the formation of a Constitution.  He goes on to tell us how it can be done.  As I understand him, he holds that it can be done by the Territorial Legislature refusing to make any enactments for the protection of slavery in the Territory, and especially by adopting unfriendly legislation to it.  For the sake of clearness I state it again; that they can exclude slavery from the Territory, 1st, by withholding what he assumes to be an indispensable assistance to it in the way of legislation; and, 2d, by unfriendly legislation.  If I rightly understand him, I wish to ask your attention for a while to his position.

In the first place, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that any Congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories is unconstitutional—that they have reached this proposition as a conclusion from their former proposition, that the Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and from that other Constitutional provision, that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.  Hence they reach the conclusion that as the Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and prohibits any person from being deprived of property without due process of law, to pass an act of Congress by which a man who owned a slave on one side of a line would be deprived of him if he took him on the other side, is depriving him of that property without due process of law.  That I understand to be the decision of the Supreme Court.  I understand also that Judge Douglas adheres most firmly to that decision; and the difficulty is, how is it possible for any power to exclude slavery from the Territory unless in violation of that decision?  That is the difficulty.

In the Senate of the United States, in 1850, Judge Trumbull, in a speech, substantially, if not directly, put the same interrogatory to Judge Douglas, as to whether the people of a Territory had the lawful power to exclude slavery prior to the formation of a Constitution?  Judge Douglas then answered at considerable length, and his answer will be found in the Congressional Globe, under date of June 9^th, 1856.  The Judge said that whether the people could exclude slavery prior to the formation of a Constitution or not was a question to be decided by the Supreme Court.  He put that proposition, as will be seen by the Congressional Globe, in a variety of forms, all running to the same thing in substance—that it was a question for the Supreme Court.  I maintain that when he says, after the Supreme Court have decided the question, that the people may yet exclude slavery by any means whatever, he does virtually say, that it is not a question for the Supreme Court.  He shifts his ground.  I appeal to you whether he did not say it was a question for the Supreme Court?  Has not the Supreme Court decided that question?  When he now says the people may exclude slavery, does he not make it a question for the people?  Does he not virtually shift his ground and say that it is not a question for the court, but for the people?  This is a very simple proposition—a very plain and naked one.  It seems to me that there is no difficulty in deciding it.  In a variety of ways he said that it was a question for the Supreme Court.  He did not stop then to tell us that whatever the Supreme Court decides, the people can by withholding necessary “police regulations” keep slavery out.  He did not make any such answer.  I submit to you now, whether the new state of the case has not induced the Judge to sheer away from his original ground.  Would not this be the impression of every fair-minded man?

I hold that the proposition that slavery cannot enter a new country without police regulations is historically false.  It is not true at all.  I hold that the history of this country shows that the institution of slavery was originally planted upon this continent without these “police regulations” which the Judge now thinks necessary for the actual establishment of it.  Not only so, but is there not another fact—how came this Dred Scott decision to be made?  It was made upon the case of a negro being taken and actually held in slavery in Minnesota Territory, claiming his freedom because the act of Congress prohibited his being so held there.  Will the Judge pretend that Dred Scott was not held there without police regulations?  There is at least one matter of record as to his having been held in slavery in the Territory, not only without police regulations, but in the teeth of Congressional legislation supposed to be valid at the time.  This shows that there is vigor enough in slavery to plant itself in a new country even against unfriendly legislation.  It takes not only law but the enforcement of law to keep it out.  That is the history of this country upon the subject.

I wish to ask one other question.  It being understood that the Constitution of the United States guaranties property in slaves in the Territories, if there is any infringement of the right of that property, would not the United States Courts, organized for the government of the Territory, apply such remedy as might be necessary in that case?  It is a maxim held by the courts, that there is no wrong without its remedy; and the courts have a remedy for whatever is acknowledged and treated as a wrong.

Again: I will ask you, my friends, if you were elected members of the Legislature, what would be the first thing you would have to do before entering upon your duties?  Swear to support the Constitution of the United States.  Suppose you believe, as Judge Douglas does, that the Constitution of the United States guaranties to your neighbor the right to hold slaves in that Territory—that they are his property—how can you clear your oaths unless you give him such legislation as is necessary to enable him to enjoy that property?  What do you understand by supporting the Constitution of a State, or of the United States?  Is it not to give such Constitutional helps to the rights established by that Constitution as may be practically needed?  Can you, if you swear to support the Constitution, and believe that the Constitution establishes a right, clear your oath, without giving it support?  Do you support the Constitution if, knowing or believing there is a right established under it which needs specific legislation, you withhold that legislation?  Do you not violate and disregard your oath?  I can conceive of nothing plainer in the world.  There can be nothing in the words “support the Constitution,” if you may run counter to it by refusing support to any right established under the Constitution.  And what I say here will hold with still more force against the Judge’s doctrine of “unfriendly legislation.”  How could you, having sworn to support the Constitution and believing it guarantied the right to hold slaves in the Territories, assist in legislation intended to defeat that right?  That would be violating your own view of the Constitution.  Not only so, but if you were to do so, how long would it take the courts to hold your votes unconstitutional and void?  Not a moment.

Lastly I would ask—is not Congress, itself, under obligation to give legislative support to any right that is established under the United States Constitution?  I repeat the question—is not Congress, itself, bound to give legislative support to any right that is established in the United States Constitution?  A member of Congress swears to support the Constitution of the United States, and if he sees a right established by that Constitution which needs specific legislative protection, can he clear his oath without giving that protection?  Let me ask you why many of us who are opposed to slavery upon principle, give our acquiescence to a Fugitive Slave law?  Why do we hold ourselves under obligations to pass such a law, and abide by it when it is passed?  Because the Constitution makes provision that the owners of slaves shall have the right to reclaim them.  It gives the right to reclaim slaves, and that right is, as Judge Douglas says, a barren right, unless there is legislation that will enforce it. 

The mere declaration, “No person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due,” is powerless without specific legislation to enforce it.  Now, on what ground would a member of Congress who is opposed to slavery in the abstract, vote for a Fugitive law, as I would deem it my duty to do?  Because there is a Constitutional right which needs legislation to enforce it.  And although it is distasteful to me, I have sworn to support the Constitution, and having so sworn, I cannot conceive that I do support it if I withhold from that right any necessary legislation to make it practical.  And if that is true in regard to a Fugitive Slave law, is the right to have fugitive slaves reclaimed any better fixed in the Constitution than the right to hold slaves in the Territories?  For this decision is a just exposition of the Constitution, as Judge Douglas thinks.  Is the one right any better than the other?  Is there any man who, while a member of Congress, would give support to the one any more than the other?  If I wished to refuse to give legislative support to slave property in the Territories, if a member of Congress, I could not do it, holding the view that the Constitution establishes that right.  If I did it at all, it would be because I deny that this decision properly construes the Constitution.  But if I acknowledge, with Judge Douglas, that this decision properly construes the Constitution, I cannot conceive that I would be less than a perjured man if I should refuse in Congress to give such protection to that property as in its nature it needed.

At the end of what I have said here I propose to give the Judge my fifth interrogatory, which he may take and answer at his leisure.  My fifth interrogatory is this:

If the slaveholding citizens of a United States Territory should need and demand Congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such Territory, would you, as a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?

Judge Douglas—“Will you repeat that?  I want to answer that question.”

Mr. Lincoln—If the slaveholding citizens of a United States Territory should need and demand Congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such Territory, would you, as a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?

I am aware that in some of the speeches Judge Douglas has made, he has spoken as if he did not know or think that the Supreme Court had decided that a Territorial Legislature cannot exclude slavery.  Precisely what the Judge would say upon the subject—whether he would say definitely that he does not understand they have so decided, or whether he would say he does understand that the court have so decided, I do not know; but I know that in his speech at Springfield he spoke of it as a thing they had not decided yet; and in his answer to me at Freeport, he spoke of it so far again, as I can comprehend it, as a thing that had not yet been decided.  Now I hold that if the Judge does entertain that view, I think that he is not mistaken in so far as it can be said that the court has not decided any thing save the mere question of jurisdiction.  I know the legal arguments that can be made—that after a court has decided that it cannot take jurisdiction in a case, it then has decided all that is before it, and that is the end of it.  A plausible argument can be made in favor of that proposition, but I know that Judge Douglas has said in one of his speeches that the court went forward, like honest men as they were, and decided all the points in the case.  If any points are really extra-judicially decided because not necessarily before them, then this one as to the power of the Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery is one of them, as also the one that the Missouri Compromise was null and void.  They are both extra-judicial, or neither is, according as the court held that they had no jurisdiction in the case between the parties, because of want of capacity of one party to maintain a suit in that court.  I want, if I have sufficient time, to show that the court did pass its opinion, but that is the only thing actually done in the case.  If they did not decide, they showed what they were ready to decide whenever the matter was before them.  What is that opinion?  After having argued that Congress had no power to pass a law excluding slavery from a United States Territory, they then used language to this effect:  That inasmuch as Congress itself could not exercise such a power, it followed as a matter of course that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise it, for the Territorial Legislature can do no more than Congress could do.  Thus it expressed its opinion emphatically against the power of a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery, leaving us in just as little doubt on that point as upon any other point they really decided.

Now, my fellow-citizens, I will detain you only a little while longer.  My time is nearly out.  I find a report of a speech made by Judge Douglas at Joliet, since we last met at Freeport—published, I believe, in the Missouri Republican—on the 9th of this month, in which Judge Douglas says

“You know at Ottawa, I read this platform, and asked him if he concurred in each and all of the principles set forth in it.  He would not answer these questions.  At last I said frankly, I wish you to answer them, because when I get them up here where the color of your principles are a little darker than in Egypt, I intend to trot you down to Jonesboro.  The very notice that I was going to take him down to Egypt made him tremble in the knees so that he had to be carried from the platform.  He laid up seven days, and in the meantime held a consultation with his political physicians; they had Lovejoy and Farnsworth and all the leaders of the Abolition party, they consulted it all over, and at last Lincoln came to the conclusion that he would answer, so he came up to Freeport last Friday.”

Now that statement altogether furnishes a subject for philosophical contemplation.  I have been treating it in that way, and I have really come to the conclusion that I can explain it in no other way than by believing the Judge is crazy.  If he was in his right mind, I cannot conceive how he would have risked disgusting the four or five thousand of his own friends who stood there, and knew, as to my having been carried from the platform, that there was not a word of truth in it.

Judge Douglas—“Didn’t they carry you off?”

Mr. Lincoln—There; that question illustrates the character of this man Douglas, exactly.  He smiles now and says, “Didn’t they carry you off?” But he said then, “he had to be carried off;” and he said it to convince the country that he had so completely broken me down by his speech that I had to be carried away.  Now he seeks to dodge it, and asks, “Didn’t they carry you off?”  Yes, they did.  But, Judge Douglas, why didn’t you tell the truth?  I would like to know why you didn’t tell the truth about it.  And then again, “He laid up seven days.”  He puts this in print for the people of the country to read as a serious document.  I think if he had been in his sober senses he would not have risked that barefacedness in the presence of thousands of his own friends, who knew that I made speeches within six of the seven days at Henry, Marshall county; Augusta, Hancock county, and Macomb, McDonough county, including all the necessary travel to meet him again at Freeport at the end of the six days.  Now, I say, there is no charitable way to look at that statement, except to conclude that he is actually crazy.  There is another thing in that statement that alarmed me very greatly as he states it, that he was going to “trot me down to Egypt.”  Thereby he would have you to infer that I would not come to Egypt unless he forced me—that I could not be got here, unless he, giant like, had hauled me down here.  That statement he makes, too, in the teeth of the knowledge that I had made the stipulation to come down here, and that he himself had been very reluctant to enter into the stipulation.  More than all this, Judge Douglas, when he made that statement, must have been crazy, and wholly out of his sober senses, or else he would have known that when he got me down here—that promise—that windy promise—of his powers to annihilate me, wouldn’t amount to anything.  Now, how little do I look like being carried away trembling?  Let the Judge go on, and after he is done with his half hour, I want you all, if I can’t go home myself, to let me stay and rot here; and if anything happens to the Judge, if I cannot carry him to the hotel and put him to bed, let me stay here and rot.  I say, then, there is something extraordinary in this statement.  I ask you if you know any other living man who would make such a statement?  I will ask my friend Casey, over there, if he would do such a thing?  Would he send that out and have his men take it as the truth?  Did the Judge talk of trotting me down to Egypt to scare me to death?  Why, I know this people better than he does.  I was raised just a little east of here.  I am a part of this people.  But the Judge was raised further north, and perhaps he has some horrid idea of what this people might be induced to do.  But really I have talked about this matter perhaps longer than I ought, for it is no great thing, and yet the smallest are often the most difficult things to deal with.  The Judge has set about seriously trying to make the impression that when we meet at different places I am literally in his clutches—that I am a poor, helpless, decrepit mouse, and that I can do nothing at all.  This is one of the ways he has taken to create that impression.  I don’t know any other way to meet it, except this.  I don’t want to quarrel with him—to call him a liar—but when I come square up to him I don’t know what else to call him, if I must tell the truth out.  I want to be at peace, and reserve all my fighting powers for necessary occasions.  My time, now, is very nearly out, and I give up the trifle that is left to the Judge, to let him set my knees trembling again, if he can.

MR. DOUGLAS'S REPLY.

My friends, while I am very grateful to you for the enthusiasm which you show for me, I will say in all candor, that your quietness will be much more agreeable than your applause, inasmuch as you deprive me of some part of my time when ever you cheer.

I will commence where Mr. Lincoln left off, and make a remark upon this serious complaint of his about my speech at Joliet.   I did say there in a playful manner that when I put these questions to Mr. Lincoln at Ottawa he failed to answer, and that he trembled and had to be carried off the stand, and required seven days to get up his reply.  That he did not walk off from that stand he will not deny.  That when the crowd went away from the stand with me, a few persons carried him home on their shoulders and laid him down, he will admit.  I wish to say to you that whenever I degrade my friends and myself by allowing them to carry me on their backs along through the public streets, when I am able to walk, I am willing to be deemed crazy.  I did not say whether I beat him or he beat me in the argument.  It is true I put these questions to him, and I put them not as mere idle questions, but showed that I based them upon the creed of the Black Republican party as declared by their Conventions in that portion of the State which he depends upon to elect him, and desired to know whether he indorsed that creed.  He would not answer.  When I reminded him that I intended bringing him into Egypt and renewing my questions if he refused to answer, he then consulted and did get up his answers one week after—answers which I may refer to in a few minutes and show you how equivocal they are.  My object was to make him avow whether or not he stood by the platform of his party; the resolutions I then read, and upon which I based my questions, had been adopted by his party in the Galena Congressional District, and the Chicago and Bloomington Congressional Districts, composing a large majority of the counties in this State that give Republican or Abolition majorities.  Mr. Lincoln cannot and will not deny that the doctrines laid down in these resolutions were in substance put forth in Lovejoy’s resolutions, which were voted for by a majority of his party, some of them, if not all, receiving the support of everyman of his party.  Hence, I laid a foundation for my questions to him before I asked him whether that was or was not the platform of his party.  He says that he answered my questions.  One of them was whether he would vote to admit any more slave States into the Union.  The creed of the Republican party as set forth in the resolutions of their various Conventions was, that they would under no circumstances vote to admit another slave State.  It was put forth in the Lovejoy resolutions in the Legislature; it was put forth and passed in a majority of all the counties of this State which give Abolition or Republican majorities, or elect members to the Legislature of that school of polities.  I had a right to know whether he would vote for or against the admission of another slave State in the event the people wanted it.  He first answered that he was not pledged on the subject, and then said, “In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in the position of having to pass on that question.  I should be exceedingly glad to know that there would never be another slave State admitted into the Union; but I must add that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people, having a fair chance and clean field when they come to adopt a Constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.”

Now analyze that answer.  In the first place he says he would be exceedingly sorry to be put in a position where he would have to vote on the question of the admission of a slave State.  Why is he a candidate for the Senate if he would be sorry to be put in that position?  I trust the people of Illinois will not put him in a position which he would be so sorry to occupy.  The next position he takes is that he would be glad to know that there would never be another slave State, yet, in certain contingencies, he might have to vote for one.  What is that contingency?  “If Congress keeps slavery out by law while it is a Territory, and then the people should have a fair chance and should adopt slavery, uninfluenced by the presence of the institution,” he supposed he would have to admit the State.  Suppose Congress should not keep slavery out during their territorial existence, then how would he vote when the people applied for admission into the Union with a slave Constitution?  That he does not answer, and that is the condition of every Territory we have now got.  Slavery is not kept out of Kansas by act of Congress, and when I put the question to Mr. Lincoln, whether he will vote for the admission with or without slavery, as her people may desire, he will not answer, and you have not got an answer from him.  In Nebraska slavery is not prohibited by act of Congress, but the people are allowed, under the Nebraska bill, to do as they please on the subject; and when I ask him whether he will vote to admit Nebraska with a slave Constitution if her people desire it, he will not answer.  So with New Mexico, Washington Territory, Arizonia, and the four new States to be admitted from Texas.  You cannot get an answer from him to these questions.  His answer only applies to a given case, to a condition—things which he knows does not exist in any one Territory in the Union.  He tries to give you to understand that he would allow the people to do as they please, and yet he dodges the question as to every Territory in the Union.  I now ask why cannot Mr. Lincoln answer to each of these Territories?  He has not done it, and he will not do it.  The Abolitionists up North understand that this answer is made with a view of not committing himself on any one Territory now in existence.  It is so understood there, and you cannot expect an answer from him on a case that applies to any one Territory, or applies to the new States which by compact we are pledged to admit out of Texas, when they have the requisite population and desire admission.  I submit to you whether he has made a frank answer, so that you can tell how he would vote in any one of these cases.  “He would be sorry to be put in the position.”  Why would he be sorry to be put in this position if his duty required him to give the vote?  If the people of a Territory ought to be permitted to come into the Union as a State, with slavery or without it, as they pleased, why not give the vote admitting them cheerfully?  If in his opinion they ought not to come in with slavery, even if they wanted to, why not say that he would cheerfully vote against their admission?  His intimation is that conscience would not let him vote “No,” and he would be sorry to do that which his conscience would compel him to do as an honest man.

In regard to the contract or bargain between Trumbull, the Abolitionists and him, which he denies, I wish to say that the charge can be proved by notorious historical facts.  Trumbull, Lovejoy, Giddings, Fred Douglass, Hale, and Banks, were traveling the State at that time making speeches on the same side and in the same cause with him.  He contents himself with the simple denial that no such thing occurred.  Does he deny that he, and Trumbull, and Breese, and Giddings, and Chase, and Fred Douglass, and Lovejoy, and all those Abolitionists and deserters from the Democratic party, did make speeches all over this State in the same common cause?  Does he deny that Jim Matheny was then, and is now, his confidential friend, and does he deny that Matheny made the charge of the bargain and fraud in his own language, as I have read it from his printed speech.  Matheny spoke of his own personal knowledge of that bargain existing between Lincoln, Trumbull, and the Abolitionists.  He still remains Lincoln’s confidential friend, and is now a candidate for Congress, and is canvassing the Springfield District for Lincoln.  I assert that I can prove the charge to be true in detail if I can ever get it where I can summon and compel the attendance of witnesses.  I have the statement of another man to the same effect as that made by Matheny, which I am not permitted to use yet, but Jim Matheny is a good witness on that point, and the history of the country is conclusive upon it.  That Lincoln up to that time had been a Whig, and then undertook to Abolitionize the Whigs and bring them into the Abolition camp, is beyond denial; that Trumbull up to that time had been a Democrat, and deserted, and undertook to Abolitionize the Democracy, and take them into the Abolition camp, is beyond denial; that they are both now active, leading, distinguished members of this Abolition Republican party, in full communion, is a fact that cannot be questioned or denied.

But Lincoln is not willing to be responsible for the creed of his party.  He complains because I hold him responsible, and in order to avoid the issue, he attempts to show that individuals in the Democratic party, many years ago, expressed Abolition sentiments.  It is true that Tom Campbell, when a candidate for Congress in 1850, published the letter which Lincoln read.  When I asked Lincoln for the date of that letter he could not give it.  The date of the letter has been suppressed by other speakers who have used it, though I take it for granted that Lincoln did not know the date.  If he will take the trouble to examine, he will find that the letter was published only two days before the election, and was never seen until after it, except in one county.  Tom Campbell would have been beat to death by the Democratic party if that letter had been made public in his district.  As to Molony, it is true he uttered sentiments of the kind referred to by Mr. Lincoln, and the best Democrats would not vote for him for that reason.  I returned from Washington after the passage of the Compromise Measures in 1850, and when I found Molony running under John Wentworth’s tutelage, and on his platform, I denounce! him, and declared that he was no Democrat.  In my speech at Chicago, just before the election that year, I went before the infuriated people of that city and vindicated the Compromise Measures of 1850.  Remember the city council had passed resolutions nullifying acts of Congress and instructing the police to withhold their assistance from the execution of the laws, and as I was the only man in the city of Chicago who was responsible for the passage of the Compromise Measures, I went before the crowd, justified each and every one of those measures, and let it be said to the eternal honor of the people of Chicago, that when they were convinced by my exposition of those measures that they were right and they had done wrong in opposing them, they repealed their nullifying resolutions and declared that they would acquiesce in and support the laws of the land.  These facts are well known, and Mr. Lincoln can only get up individual instances, dating back to 1849-50, which are contradicted by the whole tenor of the Democratic creed.

But Mr. Lincoln does not want to be held responsible for the Black Republican doctrine of no more slave States.  Farnsworth is the candidate of his party to-day in the Chicago District, and he made a speech in the last Congress in which he called upon God to palsy his right arm if he ever voted for the admission of another slave State, whether the people wanted it or not.  Lovejoy is making speeches all over the State for Lincoln now, and taking ground against any more slave States.  Washburne, the Black Republican candidate for Congress in the Galena District, is making speeches in favor of this same Abolition platform declaring no more slave States.  Why are men running for Congress in the northern districts, and taking that Abolition platform for their guide, when Mr. Lincoln does not want to be held to it down here in Egypt and in the center of the State, and objects to it so as to get votes here.  Let me tell Mr. Lincoln that his party in the northern part of the State hold to that Abolition platform, and that if they do not in the South and in the center they present the extraordinary spectacle of a “house divided against itself,” and hence “cannot stand.”  I now bring down upon him the vengeance of his own scriptural quotation, and give it a more appropriate application than he did, when I say to him that his party, Abolition in one end of the State and opposed to it in the other, is a house divided against itself, and cannot stand, and ought not to stand, for it attempts to cheat the American people out of their votes by disguising its sentiments.

Mr. Lincoln attempts to cover up and get over his Abolitionism by telling you that he was raised a little east of you, beyond the Wabash in Indiana, and he thinks that makes a mighty sound and good man of him on all these questions.  I do not know that the place where a man is born or raised has much to do with his political principles.  The worst Abolitionist I have ever known in Illinois have been men who have sold their slaves in Alabama and Kentucky, and have come here and turned Abolitionists whilst spending the money got for the negroes they sold, and I do not know that an Abolitionist from Indiana or Kentucky ought to have any more credit because he was born and raised among slaveholders.  I do not know that a native of Kentucky is more excusable because raised among slaves, his father and mother having owned slaves, he comes to Illinois, turns Abolitionist, and slanders the graves of his father and mother, and breathes curses upon the institutions under which he was born, and his father and mother bred.  True, I was not born out west here.  I was born away down in Yankee land, I was born in a valley in Vermont, with the high mountains around me.  I love the old green mountains and valleys of Vermont, where I was born, and where I played in my childhood.  I went up to visit them some seven or eight years ago, for the first time for twenty odd years.  When I got there they treated me very kindly.  They invited me to the commencement of their college, placed me on the seats with their distinguished guests, and conferred upon me the degree of LL. D.  in Latin (doctor of laws), the same as they did old Hickory, at Cambridge, many years ago, and I give you my word and honor I understood just as much of the Latin as he did.  When they got through conferring the honorary degree, they called upon me for a speech, and I got up with my heart lull and swelling with gratitude for their kindness, and I said to them, “My friends, Vermont is the most glorious spot on the face of this globe for a man to be born in, provided he emigrates when he is very young.”

I emigrated when I was very young.  I came out here when I was a boy, and I found my mind liberalized, and my opinions enlarged when I got on these broad prairies, with only the Heavens to bound my vision, instead of having them circumscribed by the little narrow ridges that surrounded the valley where I was born.  But, I discard all flings of the land where a man was born.  I wish to be judged by my principles, by those great public measures and Constitutional principles upon which the peace, the happiness and the perpetuity of this Republic now rest.

Mr. Lincoln has framed another question, propounded it to me, and desired my answer.  As I have said before, I did not put a question to him that I did not first lay a foundation for by showing that it was a part of the platform of the party whose votes he is now seeking, adopted in a majority of the counties where he now hopes to get a majority, and supported by the candidates of his party now running in those counties.  But I will answer his question.  It is as follows: “If the slaveholding citizens of a United States Territory should need and demand Congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such Territory, would you, as a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?”  I answer him that it is a fundamental article in the Democratic creed that there should be non-interference and non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States or Territories.  Mr. Lincoln could have found an answer to his question in the Cincinnati platform, if he had desired it.  The Democratic party have always stood by that great principle of noninterference and non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories alike, and I stand on that platform now.

Now I desire to call your attention to the fact that Lincoln did not define his own position in his own question.  How does he stand on that question?  He put the question to me at Freeport whether or not I would vote to admit Kansas into the Union before she had 93,420 inhabitants.  I answered him at once that it having been decided that Kansas had now population enough for a slave State, she had population enough for a free State.

I answered the question unequivocally, and then I asked him whether he would vote for or against the admission of Kansas before she had 93,420 inhabitants, and he would not answer me.  To-day he has called attention to the fact that, in his opinion, my answer on that question was not quite plain enough, and yet he has not answered it himself.  He now puts a question in relation to Congressional interference in the Territories to me.  I answer him direct, and yet he has not answered the question himself.  I ask you whether a man has any right, in common decency, to put questions in these public discussions, to his opponent, which he will not answer himself, when they are pressed home to him.  I have asked him three times, whether he would vote to admit Kansas whenever the people applied with a Constitution of their own making and their own adoption, under circumstances that were fair, just and unexceptionable, but I cannot get an answer from him.  Nor will he answer the question which he put to me, and which I have just answered in relation to Congressional interference in the Territories, by making a slave code there.

It is true that he goes on to answer the question by arguing that under the decision of the Supreme Court it is the duty of a man to vote for a slave code in the Territories.  He says that it is his duty, under the decision that the court has made, and if he believes in that decision he would be a perjured man if he did not give the vote.  I want to know whether he is not bound to a decision which is contrary to his opinions just as much as to one in accordance with his opinions.  If the decision of the Supreme Court, the tribunal created by the Constitution to decide the question, is final and binding, is he not bound by it just as strongly as if he was for it instead of against it originally?  Is every man in this land allowed to resist decisions he does not like, and only support those that meet his approval?  What are important courts worth unless their decisions are binding on all good citizens?  It is the fundamental principles of the judiciary that its decisions are final.  It is created for that purpose, so that when you cannot agree among yourselves on a disputed point you appeal to the judicial tribunal which steps in and decides for you, and that decision is then binding on every good citizen.  It is the law of the land just as much with Mr. Lincoln against it as for it.  And yet he says that if that decision is binding he is a perjured man if he does not vote for a slave code in the different Territories of this Union.  Well, if you [turning to Mr. Lincoln] are not going to resist the decision, if you obey it, and do not intend to array mob law against the constituted authorities, then, according to your own statement, you will be a perjured man if you do not vote to establish slavery in these Territories.  My doctrine is, that even taking Mr. Lincoln’s view that the decision recognizes the right of a man to carry his slaves into the Territories of the United States, if he pleases, yet after he gets there he needs affirmative law to make that right of any value.  The same doctrine not only applies to slave property, but all other kinds of property.  Chief Justice Taney places it upon the ground that slave property is on an equal footing with other property.  Suppose one of your merchants should move to Kansas and open a liquor store; he has a right to take groceries and liquors there, but the mode of selling them, and the circumstances under which they shall be sold, and all the remedies must be prescribed by local legislation, and if that is unfriendly it will drive him out just as effectually as if there was a Constitutional provision against the sale of liquor.  So the absence of local legislation to encourage and support slave property in a Territory excludes it practically just as effectually as if there was a positive Constitutional provision against it.  Hence, I assert that under the Dred Scott decision you cannot maintain slavery a day in a Territory where there is an unwilling people and unfriendly legislation.  If the people are opposed to it, our right is a barren, worthless, useless right, and if they are for it, they will support and encourage it.  We come right back, therefore, to the practical question, if the people of a Territory want slavery they will have it, and if they do not want it you cannot force it on them.  And this is the practical question, the great principle, upon which our institutions rest.  I am willing to take the decision of the Supreme Court as it was pronounced by that august tribunal without stopping to inquire whether I would have decided that way or not.  I have had many a decision made against me on questions of law which I did not like, but I was bound by them just as much as if I had had a hand in making them, and approved them.  Did you ever see a lawyer or a client lose his case that he approved the decision of the court?  They always think the decision unjust when it is given against them.  In a Government of laws like ours we must sustain the Constitution as our fathers made it, and maintain the rights of the States as they are guarantied under the Constitution, and then we will have peace and harmony between the different States and sections of this glorious Union.